Creeping Towards London

Reputedly the site of the first bomb of the war - Fore Street, EC2 (Author's photo)

 
In August 1940, the Battle of Britain was at it's height but to those people living in London, the war was still somewhat at a distance, although slowly creeping closer all the time.

The First Phase of the Battle had seen the Luftwaffe concentrating by day on shipping targets in the Channel, Straits of Dover and along the East Coast and by night on minelaying and sporadic raids on mainly coastal targets, as well as some leaflet dropping activities. The leaflets in question contained a transcript of Hitler's now famous "Last Appeal to Reason" speech made on 19th July 1940. During this typically rambling, two hour diatribe, Hitler created twelve new Field Marshals as well as promoting the Hermann Goring to the unique position of Reichsmarschall. Following this orgy of self congratulation after the Fall of France, The Fuhrer turned his attention to Britain in which he tried to appeal to the British people directly, separate from the belligerent defiance of Winston Churchill's government and stated that he saw little point in continuing with the war. Despite the talk of peace, there was still a threatening undercurrent to Hitler's speech when he made it clear that if the war was to continue, he would deal "the final blow" to Britain. Perhaps Hitler and most of his devoted audience were expecting the peace offer to be accepted after some deliberation but it must have come as something of a shock for it to be rejected out of hand within the hour in a BBC broadcast. Official rejection, in the form of a statement from Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary came on July 22nd.

With the British seemingly rejecting peace, Hitler ordered Goring to prepare for 'Adlerangriff' - Eagle Attack, culminating in 'Adlertag' - Eagle Day on August 13th 1940, which would see the complete destruction of RAF Fighter Command, thus giving the Luftwaffe the air supremacy vital for ensuring the success of an amphibious invasion, which otherwise could be devastated by the Royal Navy.

This second phase of the Battle would see concerted attacks on the RAF's radar stations and airfields, in the hope of destroying fighters on the ground, as well as drawing them up into air combat where, it was confidently predicted by the Luftwaffe High Command, that the superior strength and aircraft of the Germans would win the day.

It would take a book, rather than a blog, to write a detailed history of the Battle of Britain and there are many excellent works on the subject but we should highlight several crucial factors that are relevant to the story.

Throughout the Battle, the Luftwaffe's leadership consistently believed it's own faulty intelligence which led them to understand that the RAF was far weaker than it actually was (on 16th August the Luftwaffe estimated that Fighter Command were down to 300 aircraft - in fact on this day they had over 700 on strength) and that British aircraft production was plummeting, when in fact, it was consistently growing. There was also a refusal to accept the limitations of some of the German aircraft used in the Battle. For example, both the Do17 and He111 were slow, carried a relatively small bomb load and were unable to adequately defend themselves. The Bf109 was a superb fighter aircraft but was not designed to operate at extreme ranges and had a very limited endurance over England. The Bf110 was much trumpeted as a 'heavy fighter' and would come into it's own later in the war as a night fighter but during the Battle of Britain was consistently outclassed by the Spitfire. The Ju87 'Stuka' had to be withdrawn from the Battle as it was simply unable to defend itself in hostile skies - a situation that had never arisen during it's previous conquests in Poland and France. The Luftwaffe's aircrew, were like the RAF, superbly trained professionals but also like the RAF later in the Battle, the Luftwaffe was to suffer shortages of suitably trained aircrew because of the ongoing attrition rate and unlike the RAF, any Luftwaffe aircrew who survived being shot down, were lost as Prisoners of War. Refusal by the High Command to recognize these factors led to an overconfidence that was apparent for much of the Battle.

This overconfidence could be typified thus; at a meeting with his senior staff and Luftflotten commanders on August 15th at Karinhall, Goring's country residence outside Berlin, the Reichsmarschall, ordered that the British radar stations should no longer be attacked as it had so far proved impossible to put them out of action and that they were of doubtful value. This showed remarkable ignorance of the both the importance of radar and the abilities of his own bomber crews, as the Radar Station at Ventnor had been put out of action three days earlier and repairs were still being effected!

Pilots at readiness - RAF Kenley, August 1940 (author's collection)

Another example of this overconfidence was demonstrated when the focus of the Luftwaffe's efforts switched to knocking out the RAF's fighter airfields. Once again, the intelligence was lazy and incomplete. Almost every airfield shown on German photo reconnaissance was identified as a fighter station, this included Fleet Air Arm airfields, as well as those belonging to Coastal, Training and even Bomber Commands. As a result, the wrong airfields were often attacked and whilst the consequences could be appalling for those on the wrong end of an air raid, it had no effect on Fighter Command and some fighter airfields well within range of the Luftwaffe were never bombed during the Battle of Britain. Also, follow up reconnaissance often identified non-existent aircraft such as the American Curtiss Hawk as being destroyed, when in fact the RAF did not use this type during the Battle of Britain!

Some airfields such as Biggin Hill, Kenley and Manston were repeatedly attacked by the Luftwaffe but only the latter was ever put out of action and abandoned temporarily by Fighter Command. Too often, the German bombers would drop their loads on an airfield and the High Command would then assume it was out of action and 'chalk off' the units based there as being permanently lost. This sort of overconfidence undoubtedly added to the remarkably optimistic loss estimates quoted above.

This over claiming of losses wasn't restricted to the Germans; on September 15th 1940 for example, the RAF initially claimed 185 German aircraft shot down and immediately released these figures to the World, to great German protest and privately, to Dowding and Park's great annoyance. These latter two officers believed that the best way to come up with an accurate figure of losses was basically to count the wrecks on the ground but in the fog of war, the Air Ministry released the figures based on claims largely submitted by Leigh Mallory's 'Big Wing', thus sending out the message that the RAF were shooting down the Luftwaffe in droves and far from defeated. Whilst this sent the right message to the Americans amongst others, it also boosted Leigh Mallory and his claims for Park's job in 11 Group, but this is another story for another blog article.

In the meantime, the action began to move ever closer to the capital. On August 15th, Croydon was attacked and whilst the RAF airfield was the main target, some local factories were also hit including a radio components works as well as destroying many training aircraft on the ground. Some 63 people were killed, with many more injured and this was the first recorded raid in the Greater London area. On the following day, Esher and Wimbledon were both bombed, as was New Malden Railway Station where some railway staff and passengers were killed.

On August 18th, Croydon was once again attacked, with two Spitfires on the ground destroyed along with one airman killed and fifteen injured. The RAF Stations at Biggin Hill, West Malling and Kenley were all attacked on this day, with nine people killed and a further fifteen injured at the latter airfield, where three hangers were destroyed along with four Hurricanes and three trainer aircraft. A respite followed on the 19th August while Goring held further conferences. Activities resumed on the 20th but poor weather kept the raiders largely away from the London area until the early hours of the morning of the 23rd August, when a lone raider dropped his bombs on the suburb of Wealdstone. Later the same day Biggin Hill received another small attack but it was the following day when the attacks on the RAF's airfields resumed in earnest and when the seeds for the London Blitz were to be sewn.

In the first attacks of the day, Manston was reduced to a shambles and evacuated, for immediate use as an emergency landing ground only. RAF North Weald received the attention of fifty Do17s and He111s, which dropped some 200 bombs on the airfield, severely damaging the officers' and airmen's Married Quarters, killing nine people and wounding a further ten. During the evening, the target was Rochester and the oil refinery at Thameshaven but owing to bad navigation during indifferent weather, the bombs fell on London Wall, Islington, Finsbury, Stepney and Bethnal Green - the first bombs to fall on Central London and a foretaste of things to come.

August 25th saw the main Luftwaffe activity in the South West of England but that evening, 81 RAF bombers headed for Berlin in retaliation for the previous night's bombing of London and whilst the damage caused was slight, the loss of face caused by this attack was to lead to a major policy change and one which would not only have grave consequences for London and other British cities but which would also swing the outcome of the Battle of Britain decisively in favour of the British.

Heinkel He111 shot down at Kenley 30th August 1940 (author's collection)

The following day saw attacks on airfields resume with Kenley, Biggin Hill, Hornchurch, North Weald and Debden all attacked and with the Sergeants' Mess and NAAFI being destroyed at the latter airfield with five killed. Poor weather again kept the focus of the attacks away from the London area until August 30th, when North Weald, Kenley and Biggin Hill were again attacked. At the Kentish airfield, a trench shelter was hit, as were the WAAFs' Quarters, with 39 being killed and another 26 injured. Slough was bombed, as was the Vauxhall Motors factory in Luton, where 50 people were killed as well as severe damage being caused to the works. Attacks on airfields continued now on a daily basis with North Weald, Kenley, Croydon, Hornchurch, Rochford, Debden and Biggin Hill all regularly raided. Biggin Hill especially was pounded mercilessly but although severely damaged, the airfield was never put out of action.

On September 4th, the Vickers Armstrong factory at Brooklands in Surrey was attacked, with a shelter being hit. Some 88 people were killed and 600 were injured. The factory was out of action for four days and production of the Wellington bomber severely affected. Terrible as this attack was, it was of no consequence to Fighter Command and was another example of the Luftwaffe's poor intelligence - Brooklands had an airfield but was never used by Fighter Command. Also on this day, a lone raider, no doubt looking for a target of opportunity along the River Thames, instead dropped it's bombs on a church in Charlton, southeast London, thus giving St Paul's Church the unhappy distinction of being the first London church to be destroyed in the war. This incident was covered in the very first edition of this blog back in April 2010.

St Paul's Church Charlton - the first London church to be destroyed in the war (Greenwich Heritage Centre)

Airfield attacks continued on the following two days, with Biggin Hill and Kenley again being singled out. The Hawker factories in Kingston and Langley were also targeted but production of the Hurricane fighter was not affected.

Whilst all this was going on, a meetings took place on August 31st at which the Command Staff of the Luftwaffe drew up preliminary plans for a raid on London in reprisal for the RAF's attack of seven days previously and on September 3rd in The Hague, the Luftwaffe High Command received a personal order from Hitler for 'the start of reprisal raids against London.'

Unwittingly, Hitler was taking pressure away from the RAF's fighter airfields, allowing them to rebuild and re-group. The easing of attacks on aircraft factories was also a vital factor in allowing production to build up reserves.

The dye was cast for 'Black Saturday' September 7th and the Blitz.


Published Sources:

Dowding of Fighter Command - Vincent Orange, Grub Street 2008
The Most Dangerous Enemy - Stephen Bungay, Aurum Press 2000
The Narrow Margin - Derek Wood with Derek Dempster, Tri-Service Press 1990
Park - Vincent Orange, Grub Street 2001

The Battle of Britain: Defiants & Disasters

Defiants of 264 Squadron (RAF official photo)

Friday July 19th 1940 was the worst day of the Battle of Britain thus far for RAF Fighter Command and in particular a day that was nothing short of disastrous for 141 Squadron, flying their Boulton Paul Defiants, which before the war had been championed in certain quarters of the RAF as the preferred choice over the eight gunned Hurricanes and Spitfires.

July 19th 1940 was a showery day with bright intervals and the nine Defiants of 141 Squadron, newly arrived from Edinburgh, took off from Hawkinge a little after 12:30 and had been ordered to patrol at a height of 5,000 feet south of Folkestone. They had not long been airborne when they were 'bounced' by twenty Bf109s diving out of the sun. It was a slaughter; within moments, five of the Defiants had plummeted into the Channel, whilst a sixth crashed in Dover itself. Another of the once much-vaunted 'turret fighters' was so badly damaged as to be a write off and the remaining survivors were only saved by the timely intervention of the Hurricanes of 111 Squadron who managed to break up the attacking fighters. At the end of the engagement, four pilots and five air gunners of 141 Squadron were dead, with two more injured. The battered remnants of 141 were hurriedly sent back north, this time to Prestwick, where they could lick their wounds and await conversion to the night fighter role. The other Defiant squadron, No. 264 was also removed from the fray shortly afterwards.

The events of July 19th were the final nail in the coffin for the so called 'turret fighter' experiment. In 1938, William Sholto Douglas, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, had been of the opinion that Fighter Command should form at least 9 squadrons out of Fighter Command's then planned strength of 38. The Deputy Director of Home Operations, Donald Stevenson, went even further and argued for the Defiant to be produced in large numbers in preference to the Hurricane and Spitfire. Fortunately for the outcome of the Battle of Britain, the AOC of Fighter Command, Hugh Dowding, argued even more vigorously against this plan, and managed to keep the eight gun Spitfire and Hurricane in development and was eventually able to build his command around these two more than capable fighter aircraft.

Sholto Douglas, like Dowding and many of their contemporary senior officers in the inter-war RAF, had served in the First World War and had seen the success of the two seater Bristol Fighter in the air war over the Western Front. This was the thinking behind the Defiant, a two-seater 'heavy fighter', armed with an aft-facing powerful turret containing four .303 Browning machine guns but crucially and unlike the earlier Bristol, no forward firing machine guns. Douglas and Stevenson conveniently overlooked this fact, but fortunately for the RAF, Dowding did not and strongly objected to the introduction of what he saw as a white elephant designed on the basis of now outdated tactics. 

Sholto Douglas (left) with Keith Park at Malta 1943 (RAF)

To engage enemy bombers by day, the Defiant had to place itself in the most vulnerable position for an attacking aircraft - ahead of and below it's intended prey and whilst it could adequately defend itself against a stern attack by fighters, it was helpless against a determined head on attack. Furthermore, although it was powered by the same Merlin engine that made the Hurricane and Spitfire such nimble adversaries for the Luftwaffe fighters, the Defiant was over half a ton heavier than than the Hurricane, as it carried the extra weight of both the turret and the air gunner, making it sluggish in the extreme.

In it's initial encounters with the Luftwaffe over Dunkirk, the Defiants of 264 Squadron had acquitted themselves well as the pilots of the Bf109s had mistakenly identified them as Hurricanes and had received an unpleasant surprise when they attacked from astern. By July 1940, however, the secret was out and the German pilots had amended their tactics accordingly with disastrous results for the pilots and particularly the air gunners of the Defiants, who found their turrets almost impossible to bale out from in combat conditions.

As mentioned earlier, the remaining Defiants were quickly removed from the action and eventually converted to the night fighter role, in which they had some limited success. However, the truth of the matter was that the concept of the 'heavy fighter' was a faulty one, in much the same way as the Bf110 'Zerstorer' or Destroyer was for the Luftwaffe and whilst the Bf110 became a more than useful night fighter, the Defiants were eventually relegated to the menial role of target tugs, as far removed from the enemy as possible.

Had Sholto Douglas had his way - and he was a man who usually did get his own way - and had Dowding been less determined in his opposition to the concept of the 'turret fighter', then Fighter Command could have gone into the Battle of Britain saddled with large numbers of a fighter that was worse than useless and which could have lost the battle inside a matter of weeks. Fortunately, Dowding knew the potential of the Spitfire and Hurricane and fought tenaciously to equip his command with these two wonderful aircraft.

Sholto Douglas was also one of the main proponents of another faulty doctrine, that of the 'Big Wing'; once again he met with implacable opposition from Dowding and whilst the latter's view prevailed long enough to ensure that the Battle of Britain would be won using the tactics preferred by Dowding and Park, that of using smaller numbers of fighters to intercept the enemy as far forward as possible, this time Douglas did get his own way and replaced Dowding as Head of Fighter Command in November 1940, replacing Park with another of his 'Big Wing' champions, Leigh-Mallory at the same time. Both of these men favoured the policy of deploying large fighter sweeps or 'Rhubarbs' over enemy occupied Europe, a policy which showed that both men had learned nothing from the Battle of Britain and which effectively placed the RAF in the same position as the Germans in 1940 - i.e. that of sending large numbers of short range, single engined interceptor fighters over enemy territory with very limited fuel endurance and with any downed pilots having little chance of getting home. It was a policy which was to cost the RAF dearly both in machines and men but which is another story.

Published Sources:

Dowding of Fighter Command - Vincent Orange, Grub Street 2008

The Most Dangerous Enemy - Stephen Bungay, Aurum Press 2000

The Narrow Margin - Derek Wood with Derek Dempster, Tri-Service Press 1990

Their Finest Hour: The Battle of Britain

Winston Churchill in 1940 (IWM)

 

July 10th 1940 is the date most commonly agreed upon by historians as that which marks the opening of the First Phase of the Battle of Britain. It would be impossible in a blog of this nature to summarize the entire Battle in one post - after all, very many authors of high repute have devoted entire books to the subject and sometimes just to cover one day of the Battle, such was it's vastness in scope and it's importance to the survival of not only this country but the Free World as a whole.

In the coming weeks and months, we shall once again look at various aspects of the Battle of Britain in this blog but for now, let us examine the speech that introduced the phrase "Battle of Britain" into the consciousness of the British people and to World history. It is perhaps sometimes forgotten that it was Winston Churchill who first used the phrase in the closing part of a 36 minute speech to the House of Commons on June 18th 1940 on the state of the war following the imminent Fall of France. The date marked the 125th anniversary of the Battle of Waterloo and when Churchill first used the phrase 'Battle of Britain', he could have only but hoped that the outcome of this battle would be as favourable as that which had taken place in 1815.

The speech is repeated verbatim below:

"I spoke the other day of the colossal military disaster which occurred when the French High Command failed to withdraw the northern Armies from Belgium at the moment when they knew that the French front was decisively broken at Sedan and on the Meuse. This delay entailed the loss of fifteen or sixteen French divisions and threw out of action for the critical period the whole of the British Expeditionary Force. Our Army and 120,000 French troops were indeed rescued by the British Navy from Dunkirk but only with the loss of their cannon, vehicles and modern equipment. This loss inevitably took some weeks to repair, and in the first two of those weeks the battle in France has been lost. When we consider the heroic resistance made by the French Army against heavy odds in this battle, the enormous losses inflicted upon the enemy and the evident exhaustion of the enemy, it may well be the thought that these 25 divisions of the best-trained and best-equipped troops might have turned the scale. However, General Weygand had to fight without them. Only three British divisions or their equivalent were able to stand in the line with their French comrades. They have suffered severely, but they have fought well. We sent every man we could to France as fast as we could re-equip and transport their formations.

I am not reciting these facts for the purpose of recrimination. That I judge to be utterly futile and even harmful. We cannot afford it. I recite them in order to explain why it was we did not have, as we could have had, between twelve and fourteen British divisions fighting in the line in this great battle instead of only three. Now I put all this aside. I put it on the shelf, from which the historians, when they have time, will select their documents to tell their stories. We have to think of the future and not of the past. This also applies in a small way to our own affairs at home. There are many who would hold an inquest in the House of Commons on the conduct of the Governments-and of Parliaments, for they are in it, too-during the years which led up to this catastrophe. They seek to indict those who were responsible for the guidance of our affairs. This also would be a foolish and pernicious process. There are too many in it. Let each man search his conscience and search his speeches. I frequently search mine.

Of this I am quite sure, that if we open a quarrel between the past and the present, we shall find that we have lost the future. Therefore, I cannot accept the drawing of any distinctions between Members of the present Government. It was formed at a moment of crisis in order to unite all the Parties and all sections of opinion. It has received the almost unanimous support of both Houses of Parliament. Its Members are going to stand together, and, subject to the authority of the House of Commons, we are going to govern the country and fight the war. It is absolutely necessary at a time like this that every Minister who tries each day to do his duty shall be respected; and their subordinates must know that their chiefs are not threatened men, men who are here today and gone tomorrow, but that their directions must be punctually and faithfully obeyed. Without this concentrated power we cannot face what lies before us. I should not think it would be very advantageous for the House to prolong this Debate this afternoon under conditions of public stress. Many facts are not clear that will be clear in a short time. We are to have a secret Session on Thursday, and I should think that would be a better opportunity for the many earnest expressions of opinion which Members will desire to make and for the House to discuss vital matters without having everything read the next morning by our dangerous foes.

 The disastrous military events which have happened during the past fortnight have not come to me with any sense of surprise. Indeed, I indicated a fortnight ago as clearly as I could to the House that the worst possibilities were open; and I made it perfectly clear then that whatever happened in France would make no difference to the resolve of Britain and the British Empire to fight on, 'if necessary for years, if necessary alone.' During the last few days we have successfully brought off the great majority of the troops we had on the line of communication in France; and seven-eighths of the troops we have sent to France since the beginning of the war-that is to say, about 350,000 out of 400,000 men-are safely back in this country. Others are still fighting with the French, and fighting with considerable success in their local encounters against the enemy. We have also brought back a great mass of stores, rifles and munitions of all kinds which had been accumulated in France during the last nine months.

We have, therefore, in this Island today a very large and powerful military force. This force comprises all our best-trained and our finest troops, including scores of thousands of those who have already measured their quality against the Germans and found themselves at no disadvantage. We have under arms at the present time in this Island over a million and a quarter men. Behind these we have the Local Defence Volunteers, numbering half a million, only a portion of whom, however, are yet armed with rifles or other firearms. We have incorporated into our Defence Forces every man for whom we have a weapon. We expect very large additions to our weapons in the near future, and in preparation for this we intend forthwith to call up, drill and train further large numbers. Those who are not called up, or else are employed during the vast business of munitions production in all its branches-and their ramifications are innumerable-will serve their country best by remaining at their ordinary work until they receive their summons. We have also over here Dominions armies. The Canadians had actually landed in France, but have now been safely withdrawn, much disappointed, but in perfect order, with all their artillery and equipment. And these very high-class forces from the Dominions will now take part in the defence of the Mother Country.

Lest the account which I have given of these large forces should raise the question: Why did they not take part in the great battle in France? I must make it clear that, apart from the divisions training and organizing at home, only 12 divisions were equipped to fight upon a scale which justified their being sent abroad. And this was fully up to the number which the French had been led to expect would be available in France at the ninth month of the war. The rest of our forces at home have a fighting value for home defence which will, of course, steadily increase every week that passes. Thus, the invasion of Great Britain would at this time require the transportation across the sea of hostile armies on a very large scale, and after they had been so transported they would have to be continually maintained with all the masses of munitions and supplies which are required for continuous battle-as continuous battle it will surely be.

Here is where we come to the Navy-and after all, we have a Navy. Some people seem to forget that we have a Navy. We must remind them. For the last thirty years I have been concerned in discussions about the possibilities of oversea invasion, and I took the responsibility on behalf of the Admiralty, at the beginning of the last war, of allowing all regular troops to be sent out of the country. That was a very serious step to take, because our Territorials had only just been called up and were quite untrained. Therefore, this Island was for several months particularly denuded of fighting troops. The Admiralty had confidence at that time in their ability to prevent a mass invasion even though at that time the Germans had a magnificent battle fleet in the proportion of 10 to 16, even though they were capable of fighting a general engagement every day and any day, whereas now they have only a couple of heavy ships worth speaking of-the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau. We are also told that the Italian Navy is to come out and gain sea superiority in these waters. If they seriously intend it, I shall only say that we shall be delighted to offer Signor Mussolini a free and safeguarded passage through the Strait of Gibraltar in order that he may play the part to which he aspires. There is a general curiosity in the British Fleet to find out whether the Italians are up to the level they were at in the last war or whether they have fallen off at all.

Therefore, it seems to me that as far as sea-borne invasion on a great scale is concerned, we are far more capable of meeting it today than we were at many periods in the last war and during the early months of this war, before our other troops were trained, and while the B.E.F. had proceeded abroad. Now, the Navy have never pretended to be able to prevent raids by bodies of 5,000 or 10,000 men flung suddenly across and thrown ashore at several points on the coast some dark night or foggy morning. The efficacy of sea power, especially under modern conditions, depends upon the invading force being of large size; It has to be of large size, in view of our military strength, to be of any use. If it is of large size, then the Navy have something they can find and meet and, as it were, bite on. Now, we must remember that even five divisions, however lightly equipped, would require 200 to 250 ships, and with modern air reconnaissance and photography it would not be easy to collect such an armada, marshal it, and conduct it across the sea without any powerful naval forces to escort it; and there would be very great possibilities, to put it mildly, that this armada would be intercepted long before it reached the coast, and all the men drowned in the sea or, at the worst blown to pieces with their equipment while they were trying to land. We also have a great system of minefields, recently strongly reinforced, through which we alone know the channels. If the enemy tries to sweep passages through these minefields, it will be the task of the Navy to destroy the mine-sweepers and any other forces employed to protect them. There should be no difficulty in this, owing to our great superiority at sea.

Those are the regular, well-tested, well-proved arguments on which we have relied during many years in peace and war. But the question is whether there are any new methods by which those solid assurances can be circumvented. Odd as it may seem, some attention has been given to this by the Admiralty, whose prime duty and responsibility is to destroy any large sea-borne expedition before it reaches, or at the moment when it reaches, these shores. It would not be a good thing for me to go into details of this. It might suggest ideas to other people which they have not thought of, and they would not be likely to give us any of their ideas in exchange. All I will say is that untiring vigilance and mind-searching must be devoted to the subject, because the enemy is crafty and cunning and full of novel treacheries and stratagems. The House may be assured that the utmost ingenuity is being displayed and imagination is being evoked from large numbers of competent officers, well-trained in tactics and thoroughly up to date, to measure and counterwork novel possibilities. Untiring vigilance and untiring searching of the mind is being, and must be, devoted to the subject, because, remember, the enemy is crafty and there is no dirty trick he will not do.

Some people will ask why, then, was it that the British Navy was not able to prevent the movement of a large army from Germany into Norway across the Skagerrak? But the conditions in the Channel and in the North Sea are in no way like those which prevail in the Skagerrak. In the Skagerrak, because of the distance, we could give no air support to our surface ships, and consequently, lying as we did close to the enemy's main air power, we were compelled to use only our submarines. We could not enforce the decisive blockade or interruption which is possible from surface vessels. Our submarines took a heavy toll but could not, by themselves, prevent the invasion of Norway. In the Channel and in the North Sea, on the other hand, our superior naval surface forces, aided by our submarines, will operate with close and effective air assistance.

This brings me, naturally, to the great question of invasion from the air, and of the impending struggle between the British and German Air Forces. It seems quite clear that no invasion on a scale beyond the capacity of our land forces to crush speedily is likely to take place from the air until our Air Force has been definitely overpowered. In the meantime, there may be raids by parachute troops and attempted descents of airborne soldiers. We should be able to give those gentry a warm reception both in the air and on the ground, if they reach it in any condition to continue the dispute. But the great question is: Can we break Hitler's air weapon? Now, of course, it is a very great pity that we have not got an Air Force at least equal to that of the most powerful enemy within striking distance of these shores. But we have a very powerful Air Force which has proved itself far superior in quality, both in men and in many types of machine, to what we have met so far in the numerous and fierce air battles which have been fought with the Germans. In France, where we were at a considerable disadvantage and lost many machines on the ground when they were standing round the aerodromes, we were accustomed to inflict in the air losses of as much as two and two-and-a-half to one. In the fighting over Dunkirk, which was a sort of no-man's-land, we undoubtedly beat the German Air Force, and gained the mastery of the local air, inflicting here a loss of three or four to one day after day. Anyone who looks at the photographs which were published a week or so ago of the re-embarkation, showing the masses of troops assembled on the beach and forming an ideal target for hours at a time, must realize that this re-embarkation would not have been possible unless the enemy had resigned all hope of recovering air superiority at that time and at that place.

In the defense of this Island the advantages to the defenders will be much greater than they were in the fighting around Dunkirk. We hope to improve on the rate of three or four to one which was realized at Dunkirk; and in addition all our injured machines and their crews which get down safely-and, surprisingly, a very great many injured machines and men do get down safely in modern air fighting-all of these will fall, in an attack upon these Islands, on friendly. soil and live to fight another day; whereas all the injured enemy machines and their complements will be total losses as far as the war is concerned.

During the great battle in France, we gave very powerful and continuous aid to. the French Army, both by fighters and bombers; but in spite of every kind of pressure we never would allow the entire metropolitan fighter strength of the Air Force to be consumed. This decision was painful, but it was also right, because the fortunes of the battle in France could not have been decisively affected even if we had thrown in our entire fighter force. That battle was lost by the unfortunate strategical opening, by the extraordinary and unforeseen power of the armored columns, and by the great preponderance of the German Army in numbers. Our fighter Air Force might easily have been exhausted as a mere accident in that great struggle, and then we should have found ourselves at the present time in a very serious plight. But as it is, I am happy to inform the House that our fighter strength is stronger at the present time relatively to the Germans, who have suffered terrible losses, than it has ever been; and consequently we believe ourselves possessed of the capacity to continue the war in the air under better conditions than we have ever experienced before. I look forward confidently to the exploits of our fighter pilots-these splendid men, this brilliant youth-who will have the glory of saving their native land, their island home, and all they love, from the most deadly of all attacks.

There remains, of course, the danger of bombing attacks, which will certainly be made very soon upon us by the bomber forces of the enemy. It is true that the German bomber force is superior in numbers to ours; but we have a very large bomber force also, which we shall use to strike at military targets in Germany without intermission. I do not at all underrate the severity of the ordeal which lies before us; but I believe our countrymen will show themselves capable of standing up to it, like the brave men of Barcelona, and will be able to stand up to it, and carry on in spite of it, at least as well as any other people in the world. Much will depend upon this; every man and every woman will have the chance to show the finest qualities of their race, and render the highest service to their cause. For all of us, at this time, whatever our sphere, our station, our occupation or our duties, it will be a help to remember the famous lines: He nothing common did or mean, Upon that memorable scene.

I have thought it right upon this occasion to give the House and the country some indication of the solid, practical grounds upon which we base our inflexible resolve to continue the war. There are a good many people who say, "Never mind. Win or lose, sink or swim, better die than submit to tyranny-and such a tyranny." And I do not dissociate myself from them. But I can assure them that our professional advisers of the three Services unitedly advise that we should carry on the war, and that there are good and reasonable hopes of final victory. We have fully informed and consulted all the self-governing Dominions, these great communities far beyond the oceans who have been built up on our laws and on our civilization, and who are absolutely free to choose their course, but are absolutely devoted to the ancient Motherland, and who feel themselves inspired by the same emotions which lead me to stake our all upon duty and honor. We have fully consulted them, and I have received from their Prime Ministers, Mr. Mackenzie King of Canada, Mr. Menzies of Australia, Mr. Fraser of New Zealand, and General Smuts of South Africa-that wonderful man, with his immense profound mind, and his eye watching from a distance the whole panorama of European affairs-I have received from all these eminent men, who all have Governments behind them elected on wide franchises, who are all there because they represent the will of their people, messages couched in the most moving terms in which they endorse our decision to fight on, and declare themselves ready to share our fortunes and to persevere to the end. That is what we are going to do.

We may now ask ourselves: In what way has our position worsened since the beginning of the war? It has worsened by the fact that the Germans have conquered a large part of the coast line of Western Europe, and many small countries have been overrun by them. This aggravates the possibilities of air attack and adds to our naval preoccupations. It in no way diminishes, but on the contrary definitely increases, the power of our long-distance blockade. Similarly, the entrance of Italy into the war increases the power of our long-distance blockade. We have stopped the worst leak by that. We do not know whether military resistance will come to an end in France or not, but should it do so, then of course the Germans will be able to concentrate their forces, both military and industrial, upon us. But for the reasons I have given to the House these will not be found so easy to apply. If invasion has become more imminent, as no doubt it has, we, being relieved from the task of maintaining a large army in France, have far larger and more efficient forces to meet it.

If Hitler can bring under his despotic control the industries of the countries he has conquered, this will add greatly to his already vast armament output. On the other hand, this will not happen immediately, and we are now assured of immense, continuous and increasing support in supplies and munitions of all kinds from the United States; and especially of aeroplanes and pilots from the Dominions and across the oceans coming from regions which are beyond the reach of enemy bombers.

I do not see how any of these factors can operate to our detriment on balance before the winter comes; and the winter will impose a strain upon the Nazi regime, with almost all Europe writhing and starving under its cruel heel, which, for all their ruthlessness, will run them very hard. We must not forget that from the moment when we declared war on the 3rd September it was always possible for Germany to turn all her Air Force upon this country, together with any other devices of invasion she might conceive, and that France could have done little or nothing to prevent her doing so. We have, therefore, lived under this danger, in principle and in a slightly modified form, during all these months. In the meanwhile, however, we have enormously improved our methods of defense, and we have learned what we had no right to assume at the beginning, namely, that the individual aircraft and the individual British pilot have a sure and definite superiority. Therefore, in casting up this dread balance sheet and contemplating our dangers with a disillusioned eye, I see great reason for intense vigilance and exertion, but none whatever for panic or despair.

During the first four years of the last war the Allies experienced nothing but disaster and disappointment. That was our constant fear: one blow after another, terrible losses, frightful dangers. Everything miscarried. And yet at the end of those four years the morale of the Allies was higher than that of the Germans, who had moved from one aggressive triumph to another, and who stood everywhere triumphant invaders of the lands into which they had broken. During that war we repeatedly asked ourselves the question: How are we going to win? and no one was able ever to answer it with much precision, until at the end, quite suddenly, quite unexpectedly, our terrible foe collapsed before us, and we were so glutted with victory that in our folly we threw it away.

We do not yet know what will happen in France or whether the French resistance will be prolonged, both in France and in the French Empire overseas. The French Government will be throwing away great opportunities and casting adrift their future if they do not continue the war in accordance with their Treaty obligations, from which we have not felt able to release them. The House will have read the historic declaration in which, at the desire of many Frenchmen-and of our own hearts-we have proclaimed our willingness at the darkest hour in French history to conclude a union of common citizenship in this struggle. However matters may go in France or with the French Government, or other French Governments, we in this Island and in the British Empire will never lose our sense of comradeship with the French people. If we are now called upon to endure what they have been suffering, we shall emulate their courage, and if final victory rewards our toils they shall share the gains, aye, and freedom shall be restored to all. We abate nothing of our just demands; not one jot or tittle do we recede. Czechs, Poles, Norwegians, Dutch, Belgians have joined their causes to our own. All these shall be restored.

What General Weygand called the Battle of France is over. I expect that the Battle of Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle depends the survival of Christian civilization. Upon it depends our own British life, and the long continuity of our institutions and our Empire. The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this Island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be free and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of perverted science. Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say, 'This was their finest hour.' "

Churchill's speeches were sometimes know for their exaggeration but on this occasion, this was not the case and even 75 years on, the consequences for the Free World of a British defeat in the Battle do not bear thinking about. The Battle of Britain was to demonstrate to the rest of the World, especially to the United States that Britain was not defeated and that the hitherto invincible Nazi war machine could be defeated and stopped. 

Even now, it is debatable as to whether Hitler really wanted an invasion of this country, or whether he felt he could bring Britain to heel through defeating the RAF and by the mere threat of invasion, installing a puppet government  along the lines of Marshal Petain's Vichy regime in France, thus taking Britain out of the war and allowing him to concentrate his entire forces on Russia.

After the war, when German Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt was interrogated by the Russians whilst in British custody, he was asked which battle he viewed as being the most decisive to the eventual outcome of the war. The Russians were no doubt expecting him to say 'Stalingrad' but instead the old Field Marshall replied 'The Battle of Britain.' Perhaps von Rundstedt said this merely to spite the Russians but whatever the reason, it was not the answer they were looking for and they promptly ended their questioning and left!

Even today, 75 years after the event, the Battle of Britain evokes powerful emotions and talk of 'The Few', Spitfires, Hurricanes, Dowding, Park as well as the Commonwealth and overseas pilots, Kiwis, Canadians, Poles, Czechs and Americans amongst the 2,927 pilots of all Allied nationalities who flew in the Battle, of which 510 perished.

We should be eternally grateful to them all.

Published Sources:

The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain - Stephen Bungay, Aurum Press 2000 

The Narrow Margin - Derek Wood with Derek Dempster - Tri Service Press 1990

Captain Evans, Monty and the Flying Fortress - an update

Monty with the crew of Theresa Leta (Bobbie Kinnear collection)

Regular readers may remember that in February 2014, I recounted some of the exploits of Captain (later Colonel) Richard E Evans USAAF and his crew when they were flying the Theresa Leta, B17 Flying Fortress which General Bernard Law Montgomery had 'won' in what was thought by General Eisenhower to be a light-hearted wager but which the deadly serious British general had insisted be 'paid out' to him.

Monty 'Learning the Ropes' (Bobbie Kinnear collection)

At the time of writing the second part of the story, I had a feeling that my crew list was incomplete but following a further meeting in London with Bobbie, her husband John and daughter Kate, I was alerted to a book called "Victory Mail of World War II; V-Mail, The Funny Mail" by Captain James W Hudson, who was heavily involved in the setting up of this vital morale boosting method of communicating with home for the boys posted overseas.

Monty at the controls (Bobbie Kinnear collection)

Although Hudson was based in Egypt running the V-Mail system, his official title was 'Senior Photographic Officer in the US Army Forces, Middle East' and thus in November 1943, he was appointed to be Photographic Censor for the Cairo Conference between Winston Churchill and President Franklin D Roosevelt  and ended up taking many of the photos of this event himself. Later still, he was at the 'Big Three' conference in Tehran, when Prime Minister and President were joined by Soviet Leader, Josef Stalin and it was during this period that Hudson got to fly in the Theresa Leta along with some illustrious passengers.

Bobbie has subsequently most kindly sent me a copy of the book, as well as some of the original photos that form part of her collection and which also appear in the book - perhaps originally taken by James Hudson.

As a result of reading Hudson's chapter on the Theresa Leta and her crew, as well as Captain Evans' as yet unpublished memoir, we can now show the complete crew list, their rank and position aboard Theresa Leta and where known, their hometown in the USA.

The Crew of the Theresa Leta:

Captain Richard E Evans (Pilot) (Tennessee)
Lieutenant Fred I Johnson (Co-Pilot) (Logansport, Indiana)
2nd Lieutenant Albert L Beringsmith (Bombardier) (Chicago, Illinois)
2nd Lieutenant Thomas Carver (Navigator) (Alameda, California)
Tech. Sergeant Dale Owens (Flight Engineer)
Staff Sergeant Francis (Frank) R Morris (Radio Operator) (Soodenow, Illinois)
Staff Sergeant Victor Kennedy (Waist Gunner) (Tylertown, Mississippi)
Tech. Sergeant Lewis (Top Turret)
Staff Sergeant Austin (Ball Turret)
Staff Sergeant Charles (Chuck) W Ward (Tail Gunner) (Albuquerque, New Mexico)

Also after writing the first series of articles, I received an email from Lee Beringsmith, the son of the Bombardier, Albert L Beringsmith. Lee spoke very highly of Captain Evans and recalled that his father felt that he was the best pilot in the squadron and gladly swapped places with another bombardier who suffered from nervous problems and wanted off Captain Evans' crew. Lee also kindly recounted an amusing story but one in which we see Monty's sometimes well hidden 'human' side which showed his insistence at nothing but the best for the men under his command:

"My Dad told me that when they reached Cairo, Monty had them check into the Cairo Hilton as part of his personal staff. As Monty left the B17, he told Captain Evans to call him if there were any problems. When they got to the front desk at the hotel, the rather rude clerk informed them that there were no rooms available. Captain Evans asked to use the phone and reached Monty. He passed the phone to the clerk and said 'General Montgomery would like to speak to you.' The desk clerk rolled his eyes, picked up the receiver and suddenly snapped to attention, saying ' Yes sir, yes sir, right away sir.' Needless to say, rooms were somehow magically found and the crew got a well deserved rest from their combat missions."

I am indebted to Bobbie Kinnear as always for her generous sharing of her family photographs and to Lee Beringsmith for his email and shared anecdotes.

Published Sources:

Victory Mail of World War II: V-Mail, the Funny Mail - Captain James W Hudson, Xlibris Corporation 2007

Unpublished Sources:

Unpublished memoir of Colonel Richard E Evans USAF

Captain Evans, Monty and the Flying Fortress - Part Two

Richard Evans (left) and some of his crew with Monty (Bobbie Kinnear)

Having duly met King George VI and having found him to be, as Monty had predicted "A very nice chap", the time soon came for Captain Evans and his crew to start the work for which they had been selected.

This was on a flight from Tripoli to Cairo and as well as Montgomery, the B-17 carried a full party of VIPs, amongst them General Henry Maitland Wilson, known as ‘Jumbo’ due to his large size as well as the ever present ‘Freddie’ de Guingand. The atmosphere was relaxed as the crew of the bomber gave their British guests an impromptu tour of the aircraft, even allowing the British Generals the opportunity to squeeze into some of the gun positions. Whilst all this was going on, Monty was settled into his small office area that had been set up in the converted bomb bay and carried on with his paperwork. Monty seemed – and was – an austere type but ‘Freddie’ had earlier spoken to Captain Evans and reassured him that Monty’s “disinclination to smile” as he put it, was nothing to worry about and that Monty could be “a most pleasant fellow” in the right circumstances.

Gen. Sir Henry 'Jumbo' Wilson (IWM)

During the course of the flight, Evans noticed that the oil pressure indicator on the B-17’s number 3 engine was showing a very slight drop in pressure. There was nothing particularly untoward in this; the desert environment was extremely tough on aircraft engines with sand constantly being ingested into the cylinders and gradually wearing the pistons, thus allowing oil to leak slowly into the space and escape into the airstream. Although this was a slow process at first, for an older aircraft like Theresa Leta unless the engines were replaced at regular intervals, these leaks would steadily get worse.

Even so, it was nothing to worry about, the B-17 could quite easily fly on three engines if required and as a precaution Evans decided to shut down or ‘feather’ no. 3 engine to save wear and tear and then re-start it on approach to Cairo so as to have full power available for landing. Whilst this was a slightly unusual procedure, for an experienced pilot like Richard Evans it was not an issue to cause concern. Even so, when Lieut. Johnson, the co-pilot enquired whether he should inform the passengers of the developments, Evans wisely decided against it, so as not to cause them undue alarm. Despite the wisdom of this decision, it was one which was to have repercussions for Evans – and for Monty. Leaving Theresa Leta on autopilot, Evans decided to go back and speak to his passengers and passing Monty in his office, he casually invited him up to the flight deck, having completely forgotten that his bomber was flying on three engines!

Lieut. Johnson was despatched to stretch his legs and to free up the co-pilot’s seat for Monty, who settled in gingerly. Evans felt that he was making real progress with his British master, who for the first time began to relax and speak with some freedom. It was clear that he was enjoying the flight as he spoke to Evans about his time in the British Army and his exploits against Rommel.

During this conversation, the British General suddenly noticed something and rasped in a very un-Monty like voice “It’s stopped, it’s stopped! The engine’s stopped – it’s not running!” Evans had been so engrossed in his conversation with Monty that he had completely forgotten that he had feathered the engine and now Monty had embarrassed himself in front of an American officer. Captain Evans tried his hardest to reassure Monty that there was no cause for alarm and even tried a little humour in telling the great man that Boeing had deliberately given the B-17 an excess of power just so that one engine could be switched off so as to rest it!

It was all to no avail and Monty stormed from the flight deck, clearly upset and embarrassed that his legendary calm demeanour should have cracked in front of an American officer and a fairly junior one at that. Evans cursed his forgetfulness and vowed never to let this happen again.

General George S Patton Jnr (US Army)

As well as incurring Monty’s displeasure, Evans also managed to upset the volatile American General George S Patton. This incident came when he was flying Monty and a B-17 full of distinguished British VIPs to Palermo for a conference with Patton regarding the ongoing campaign in Sicily. Apart from Montgomery himself, the passengers once again included ‘Freddie’ de Guingand and General ‘Jumbo’ Wilson, Eisenhower’s Deputy Commander.

Prior to the flight, General Patton had advised Monty that the airfield at Palermo “was satisfactory for all types of aircraft”, information that had been passed on to Evans. However, upon arrival over the airfield, it quickly became clear that Patton's aviation knowledge did not match his expertise in tank warfare. The runway looked alarmingly short for a large aircraft such as the B-17 and Evans growing apprehension could not have been helped by his then witnessing a C-47 transport aircraft, better known to the British as a Dakota and a much smaller aircraft than the B-17, run the full length of the runway before crashing in flames into the trees at one end of the airfield.

Perhaps fortunately for his passengers, they remained blissfully ignorant of affairs on the ground whilst Evans circled the field trying to assess the situation. The only positive that could be drawn was that the smoke billowing from the crashed C-47 provided an excellent indication of the wind speed and direction!

The question now for Evans was whether to attempt a landing and risk quite possible disaster, or to incur the possible displeasure of Montgomery and the certain wrath of Patton by aborting the whole operation as unsafe and returning to Gela. To add to the pressure on Captain Evans, he could already see General Patton on the ground, his polished steel helmet glistening in the Sicilian sunlight, impatiently awaiting the arrival of his British counterpart, for whom he was already developing an implacable loathing, something that would grow into an obsession by the time of the Normandy campaign a year or so later.

Against his better judgement, Evans decided to attempt a landing, confident in his own ability as a pilot to pull off a diagonal landing across the field, thus maximising the available limited space. Touching down into the brisk headwind all seemed well at first but an initial touch of the brakes revealed that the brakes on Theresa Leta had failed and that an already perilous landing on a short field was now being turned into something altogether more hazardous.

Thinking quickly, Evans decided to try to ‘ground loop’ the big bomber in an attempt to avoid meeting the same fate as the C-47 that he had seen crash earlier and indeed to avoid ploughing into it’s wreckage. This was achieved by using the engine throttles on the port wing of the aircraft to make a fast, powered turn to effectively reverse course on the ground.

Through superb skill and a little luck, Evans managed to turn a potential disaster into a very rough landing, almost a controlled crash and taxied the B-17 up to about fifty feet from where General Patton was waiting to greet his British guests. No sound could be heard from the on-board VIPs and certainly no sound was coming from General Montgomery’s makeshift office created in the bomb bay of the B-17. Outside the bomber, it quickly became clear from General Patton’s expression that he was not impressed!

Patton in fact, had a face like thunder. Notwithstanding his intense dislike of Monty and all things British, even he considered that it was bad form for an American officer and a mere Captain at that, to go endangering the life of a British general!

Patton’s ‘greeting’ to Captain Evans was brief, to the point and typical of the man – “What kind of a landing do you call that?” he asked. Evans managed to stay surprisingly calm and replied that he had executed a deliberate ground loop to avoid crashing into the burning C-47. He also added that on reflection, he should not have attempted a landing and should have returned to Gela. Captain Evans repeated his apology directly to Monty but it was quickly apparent from the British General’s expression that he too was not best pleased with his American pilot. As for Patton, his face was now crimson and for a brief moment, Captain Evans felt that the apoplectic General might actually physically strike him.

However, without any further words spoken, both of the senior officers along with their entourages piled quickly into their transport and headed for their conferences. On their next meeting, after the conference, Monty gave Evans a “slight smile” as he probably realised that the American had in fact, saved his life.

Some books, notably ‘Patton, A Genius for War’ state that the B-17 was destroyed in this incident. This was not true and after some repairs, the bomber was quickly made airworthy once more.

Despite these early setbacks in their relationship, Monty soon became genuinely attached to ‘his’ crew, holding a sincere concern for their well being and mentioned this in a letter written later that summer, which was transcribed in full in Part One of this article, the original of which is now a proud possession of Richard Evans’ daughter, Bobbie Kinnear.   

"The crew of my Fortress are a fine body of officers and men and their comfort and well being is one of my first considerations. It is a very great honour for a British general to be flown about by an American crew in an American aircraft and I am very conscious of this fact."

The relationship between Monty and Evan’s and his crew quickly became one of mutual respect and friendship and another proud possession of Bobbie Kinnear today is a photograph that Richard Evans subtitled ‘Friends at last’ which shows a smiling Monty along with Captain Evans standing in front of the Theresa Leta.

Friends at Last - Monty & Captain Evans (Bobbie Kinnear)

Richard Evans continued to fly on combat missions out of Sicily, whilst still being on call to Montgomery and actually flew Monty back to the UK for the British General to begin work on planning the invasion of Europe.It was at this time that Monty requested that Evans should stay on as his personal pilot for the Normandy campaign and beyond. Evans declined as he wished to return to full time combat duties and although Monty was disappointed, he greatly respected this decision and wrote Captain Evans a generous and sincere letter of thanks, which must surely have been a useful item to have had in one’s Army Air Force Curriculum Vitae!

The letter is reproduced below and is written in the typical no nonsense style beloved of Monty but is obviously sincere as well as being to the point:

"On the occasion of the departure of you and your crew I would like to thank you all, each one of you, for the good work you have done whilst with me.

It has been a great pleasure to have had you serving with me, and with the Eighth Army.

Good-bye and the best of luck to you all, always."

Evans and his crew may have departed but true to his word, General Eisenhower provided Montgomery with an aircraft and crew right through to the end of the war in Europe, although given the way Monty later strained their relationship, there must have been times when Ike was sorely tempted to abandon the arrangement and make his British subordinate walk!

Monty's 'thank you' letter to Richard Evans and his crew (Bobbie Kinnear)

Richard Evans and his crew returned to combat duties, flying out of Italy on raids to Venice, Rome, Pisa, Austria and targets in Southern Germany before completing fifty missions in 1944 and returning home to the USA. He then trained to fly the B-29 Superfortress for combat missions in the Pacific and actually flew three raids on Japan out of Tinian before being ordered to return to the USA in order to bring another wing of B-29s out to Tinian. The war ended before he could achieve this and instead he was ordered to fly a B-29 to Delhi and then return to Okinawa.

Evans left the USAAF in 1946 to become a financial planner in Pasadena, although he continued as a reservist. In 1952, he re-entered the Air Force as a Colonel and was made head of operations for the development of the new B-47 bomber at MacDill AFB, Florida. He did all of the flying scenes in the movie ‘Strategic Air Command’, starring James Stewart (himself an Air Corps veteran) and flew B-47s out of Thule, Greenland and bases in England.

Evans left the Air Force in 1959 and became a consultant for Northrop Grumman in the B-1 Bomber competition as well as working as a consultant for Douglas on the C-5A transport aircraft.

Richard Evans died on June 13th 2006 and was buried with full military honours having loyally served his country and the Allied cause as well as achieving much for Anglo-American relations in the process.

I am indebted to Bobbie Kinnear for making her late father’s papers and unpublished memoirs available to me. It is to be hoped that these can be published in the future as the exploits of the unsung heroes of World War Two such as Richard E Evans and his crew deserve to be read by a wider audience.

The Crew of the Theresa Leta:

Captain Richard E Evans
Lieutenant Fred I Johnson (Co-Pilot)
2nd Lieutenant Albert L Beringsmith (Bombardier)
2nd Lieutenant Thomas Carver (Navigator)
Tech. Sergeant Dale Owens (Flight Engineer)
Staff Sergeant Francis (Frank) R Morris (Radio Operator)
Staff Sergeant Victor Kennedy (Waist Gunner)
Tech. Sergeant Lewis (Top Turret)
Staff Sergeant Austin (Ball Turret)
Staff Sergeant Charles (Chuck) W Ward (Tail Gunner)

Published Sources:

The Memoirs of Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein - Collins 1958

Unpublished Sources:

Unpublished Memoirs of Colonel Richard E Evans, USAF

Captain Evans, Monty and the Flying Fortress - Part One

Bernard Law Montgomery (IWM)

In early November 2013, I had the pleasure of guiding Bobbie and John Kinnear from Santa Barbara, USA on a private walk around Westminster’s wartime past. One of the pleasures of guiding is that one often meets the most interesting people and it was clear during our conversations both via email in planning the tour and whilst actually walking the ground that my clients not only knew their subject but also had a fascinating family connection with one of the major figures of World War Two, Bernard Law Montgomery.

Bobbie’s late father, Richard E Evans, was born in 1919 and after graduating from the University of Tennessee in 1939, won a local contest sponsored by the Tennessee Air National Guard for free pilot training. Later that year, he joined the Army Air Corps and trained on the Boeing Stearman biplane, before commencing his training on the then new B-17, a large four engine bomber, designed to deliver a large bomb load over long ranges, whilst at the same time being able to defend itself as part of a larger formation. In 1941, Evans became an instructor on the B-17 and following the USA’s entering of the war at the end of 1941, he attempted to get himself posted to England as part of the fledgling Eighth Air Force but was turned down owing to his experience as an instructor. In January 1943 however, he was able to convince Colonel Fay Upthegrove, who was taking the 99th Bombardment Group to North Africa, into taking Evans along as one of his senior pilots and on the 20th of that month, the group flew to North Africa.

Colonel Fay Upthegrove (www.99bombgroup.org)

Captain Evans was part of 346th Bomb Squadron, 99th Bombardment Group, which formed part of the 12th Air Force in the North African Theatre of Operations, based in Algeria. At this time, 12th Air Force was operating in support of Allied land forces who were striving to eject Axis forces from North Africa. The Supreme Allied Commander was the then relatively little known Lieut-General Dwight D Eisenhower and one of his subordinate Army Commanders was the victor of El Alamein, Bernard Law Montgomery, or ‘Monty’ as he was universally known to the British, serviceman and civilian alike. Monty had given Britain her first major land victory over the Wehrmacht and had achieved this unaided, with British and Empire manpower alone.

This was an important victory, not only from a strategic point of view but also politically. The British effort in the war was now to be steadily overshadowed by the increasingly massive effort from the USA, both in manpower and industrial might, so it was vital to show our American allies that the British Army could beat the German war machine and that the British would not be ‘fighting to the last drop of American blood’ as some cynics on both sides of the Atlantic would believe. Monty, supremely confident in his own ability to the point of conceit, was just the man to provide this victory, although he was to prove almost as difficult a subordinate to Ike as he was an enemy to Rommel.

So, when Captain Evans was summoned to Colonel Upthegrove’s office, he could have had no idea that his life as an American officer was to become intertwined, for the next few months at least, with Britain’s great hero. Captain Evans had flown 27 missions out of a possible full combat tour of 50 or even 60 missions, so a return home was hardly on the agenda. Neither was a promotion to Major, so Evans must have been wondering what he had done to warrant this summons to his senior officer. The prospect of meeting his C.O. held few worries for Evans, for he knew that he had done nothing wrong and that Colonel Upthegrove, or ‘Uppie’ as he was informally known behind his back, was a decent and fair man, who would not be summoning him for petty or trivial reasons.

On arriving at his C.O.’s tent that passed as an office, Evans was soon put out of his misery and must have been astounded when he read his orders:

 “…by order of General Eisenhower’s Supreme Allied Headquarters, Algiers, through General Doolittle’s Twelfth Air Force Headquarters, Constantine, Algeria.”

“Captain Richard E Evans, AO-397378, 99th Bombardment Group, 12th Air Force, North Africa, ETO, is hereby relieved of his current duty assignment, is transferred to British 8th Army, and is directed to report without delay to The Army Commander, General Sir Bernard Law Montgomery.”

“A combat ready B-17 with full ammo and combat aircrew will be assigned to Captain Evans for the period of this duty.”

The All American - another B17E from 99th Bomb Group

Evans was astonished by these orders and this astonishment was transparent enough to assure Uppie that he had not been pulling a ‘fast one’ behind the Colonel’s back in order to escape further combat operations. Upthegrove had initially wondered whether Evans had family connections with Doolittle, Eisenhower, or even Monty, so he was as confused as Evans as to how and why his name had been pulled from the hat.

Evans next task was to select a crew. This was a simple task as he instinctively chose the men with whom he had been flying since bringing his B-17 across from the States; these were men that he trusted with his life and it would have been unthinkable for him to have chosen any other crew. Evans impressed upon his crew the nature of their assignment and also informed them what Uppie had told them – not to allow any harm to come to their illustrious passenger, otherwise none of them, Evans, his crew or Upthegrove, would ever hear the last of it!

Evans was mystified as to why Montgomery, a British General, should require the services of a B-17, an American aircraft, complete with crew and although the great man himself was to explain the reason personally to Evans in due course, perhaps now is a good time to put the record straight.

Eighth Army had captured Sfax on 10th April and at a previous meeting with Ike’s Chief of Staff, General Walter Bedell Smith, Monty had undertaken to capture this city no later than 15th April. Smith had told Monty that if this could be achieved, then General Eisenhower would give Monty anything he asked for. Monty, taking Smith to his word said that he would like the services of a B-17 aircraft, complete with crew for his personal use. Smith agreed, thinking that this was a semi-jocular remark by Monty. The British General however, was not well known for his sense of humour and was deadly serious; he realised that flying in a combat zone was a hazardous occupation and had hitherto been using a twin engine DC3 aircraft. Reliable enough, but unarmed and vulnerable to attack; a B-17 with four engines would give him greater comfort and reliability and would also be able to defend itself against any Germans who had gotten wind of Monty’s travel arrangements.

So, when Sfax was duly taken ahead of schedule, Monty insisted that the bet, however light heartedly it had been taken by Smith, be ‘paid up.’ Eisenhower, being the great and honourable man that he was, realised that Monty was being serious and supplied the aircraft on 16th April, which is where Captain Evans and his crew came in!

Monty inspects 'his' crew - Richard E Evans on left (Bobbie Kinnear)

It is possible that the seeds of Monty’s unpopularity in some American quarters were sewn with this incident. Eisenhower was beginning to recognise that in Monty he had a great General but another ‘Prima Donna’ to rank alongside Patton to cope with. Monty’s ‘bet’ also got him into hot water with his British superior officer; General Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, who reminded Monty that as far as Ike was concerned, the whole thing was a joke that had gotten out of hand. Brooke also pointed out that the RAF could have supplied Monty with a modern four engine aircraft, such as a Lancaster or a Halifax, to which Monty replied that indeed the RAF could have – but hadn’t, despite his repeated requests!

Monty’s own theory on the matter was that Bedell Smith had omitted to mention to Ike his initial promise of an aircraft to Monty and that when the British General had approached Eisenhower demanding ‘his’ aircraft, this was actually the first that he had heard of the proposal. This explanation is plausible and to someone like Monty, who had little in the way of social or diplomatic skills, it was all something quite simple – a bet had been made and it was time to pay up!

All this was unknown to Captain Evans and his crew as they flew into Tripoli in the ‘new’ B-17 that had been selected for this strange assignment. The bomber was not actually new at all but rather an elderly (by B-17 standards) machine named Theresa Leta. Evans never did find out exactly after whom the bomber had been named but it seemed bad luck to change it, especially when he discovered that this was the very bomber that General James Doolittle had flown down from the UK to North Africa during the Allied invasion of that continent. Theresa Leta was a B-17E; not the latest model but still a fine aircraft for a General Officer to have as his personal transport.

Later, Monty would write Evans a personal explanation of the reasons behind his getting hold of a B-17 which read as follows:

"The Fortress aircraft was given to me by General Eisenhower in April 1943, after I had captured SFAX. He came to visit me at my Army HQ shortly after the Battle of MARETH; it was the 2nd April and I was busy preparing to attack the AKARIT position and then to burst through the GABES Gap and out into the plain of central Tunisia.

Part of Monty's explanatory letter to Evans (Bobbie Kinnear)

I told General Eisenhower that when I had captured SFAX there would be need for considerable co-ordination between the action of the Allied Armies in Tunisia and this might mean a good deal of travelling about for me. I asked him if he would give me a Fortress (B17); the splendid armament of these aircraft makes an escort quite unnecessary and I would be able to travel at will and to deal easily with any enemy opposition. I said I would make him a present of SFAX by the middle of April and if he would then give me a Fortress it would be magnificent. I captured SFAX on 10th April and the Fortress was sent to me a few days later.

I have travelled many miles in it and it has saved me much fatigue. I have no hesitation in saying that having my own Fortress aircraft, so that I can travel about at will, has definitely contributed to the successful operations of the Eighth Army. I cannot express adequately my gratitude to General Eisenhower for giving it to me; he is a splendid man to serve under and it is a pleasure to be under his command.

The crew of my Fortress are a fine body of officers and men and their comfort and well-being is one of my first considerations.

It is a very great honour for a British general to be flown about by an American crew in an American aircraft and I am very conscious of this fact.

BL Montgomery

General

Eighth Army" 

Upon landing at Tripoli, Theresa Leta was met by a British lorry, the driver of which gestured to Evans to follow him, and guided by their British Allies, the B-17 lurched across the steel planking to it’s designated parking place, where Captain Evans and his crew were met by a moustachioed, very senior looking British General, who turned out to be the irrepressible General Francis De Guingand, known to all and sundry as “Freddie”, the immensely popular (and very able) Chief of Staff to General Montgomery himself. This was quite a welcome but the friendly British officer soon put Evans at ease and promptly invited the Captain and his crew to the following day’s victory celebrations which were to be attended by no less a dignitary than King George VI himself! 

General Francis 'Freddie' De Guingand (IWM)

 

After explaining the whereabouts of the crew’s accommodation and the arrangements for parking the B-17, Evans was whisked off to visit the great man himself outside his headquarters tent. Up until now, Evans had hardly had time to be nervous but his disposition could hardly have been improved when upon being introduced to his new pilot, Monty stared hard and uncomprehending at the Captain, before turning on his heels and walking straight into his tent without uttering a single word to the now bewildered American officer! 

With great presence of mind, Captain Evans decided to follow Monty into his tent to make certain he had taken on board his arrival and upon entering the tent, Evans found the Eighth Army Commander sitting at his desk, seemingly immersed in paperwork. Monty did not look up but gestured to Evans to sit down and upon his doing so, greeted him with a warm smile and stated how pleased he was to meet him! The ice was broken and Montgomery repeated the invite given earlier by De Guingand to attend the victory celebrations on the next day and to meet the King, before mentioning Evans’ first official mission, which would be to fly Monty to Cairo in a couple of days time. 

Monty was not an easy man to know or to work for and Evans would incur the great man’s displeasure quite early in their association, in fact on Monty’s first flight in the Theresa Leta.

In the next edition of this blog, we shall see how Captain Evans managed to unnerve the usually unflappable British General, as well as upsetting Monty's great rival, General George S Patton, during his tour as Monty's pilot.

Published Sources:

The Memoirs of Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein - Collins 1958

Unpublished Sources:

Unpublished Memoirs of the late Colonel Richard E Evans, USAF