Battle of Britain Day, Churchill and The Few

"Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed, by so many, to so few."

Winston Churchill was a master of the use of the English language, whether in it's written or spoken form but of all of his inspirational wartime speeches, his address to the House of Commons on August 20th 1940, in which the above passage formed a part, is arguably his most famous. Certainly the phrase 'The Few' which was how Churchill described the RAF's pilots and aircrews, passed immediately into folklore.

The origins of this phrase go back to a few days before Churchill made this speech to the House and appears to have been the result of a spontaneous piece of emotion on the Prime Minister's part. During the Battle of Britain, Churchill, always wanting to be close to the action, made a habit of calling into the Uxbridge Operations Bunker of Number 11 Group, RAF Fighter Command to see the battle developing. Uxbridge was conveniently en route from London to Chequers. His first visit came on August 16th and he was accompanied by his Chief Staff Officer, General Sir Hastings Ismay. As the afternoon's battle developed, the two watched Keith Park, AOC 11 Group, deploying his forces and seemingly having no reserves to spare. What the 'plot' in the Uxbridge bunker did not show, was that Park did in fact have reserves to call upon from the neighbouring 10 and 12 Groups. This was the strength of the defensive system perfected by Dowding and Park but all Churchill could see was that all forces had seemingly been committed. He was also very conscious of the fact that just a few weeks previously, before the fall of France, he had asked General Gamelin about the location of his strategic reserve, only to receive the terse answer "Aucune", meaning "None."

It was perhaps with this experience still fresh in his mind and unknowing of some of the other factors involved in Park's deployments, such as the neighbouring Groups' reserves, sizes of raids and the turnaround times on the ground of the RAF's fighter squadrons, that Churchill and Ismay departed by car for Chequers. The first thing Churchill said to Ismay was "Don't speak to me; I have never been so moved." Then about five minutes into the journey, he leant across and said to Ismay: "Never in the field of human conflict has so much been owed by so many to so few." Ismay was so struck by this comment that he repeated the phrase to his wife upon his return home.

So, the phrase that would mythologise the RAF's fighter pilots was born, but when Churchill made his speech just four days later, he spoke of the RAF as a whole when he said:

"The gratitude of every home in our Island, in our Empire, and indeed throughout the world, except in the abodes of the guilty, goes out to the British airmen who, undaunted by odds, unwearied in their constant challenge and mortal danger, are turning the tide of the World War by their prowess and by their devotion. Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few. All hearts go out to the fighter pilots, whose brilliant actions we see with our own eyes day after day, but we must never forget that all the time, night after night, month after month, our bomber squadrons travel far into Germany, find their targets in the darkness by the highest navigational skill, aim their attacks, often under the heaviest fire, often with serious loss, with deliberate, careful discrimination, and inflict shattering blows upon the whole of the technical and war-making structure of the Nazi power. On no part of the Royal Air Force does the weight of the war fall more heavily than on the daylight bombers who will play an invaluable part in the case of invasion and whose unflinching zeal it has been necessary in the meanwhile on numerous occasions to restrain…"

It was clear that the Prime Minister was speaking equally of the RAF's bomber squadrons, who were committed to attacking the German invasion barges and targets in Germany and their occupied territories. But to the British public, who could see the battles developing overhead on a daily basis, the phrase of 'The Few' struck a chord; it was the fighter pilots who were the saviours of the country. Whilst this was undoubtedly true, the men of Bomber Command felt somewhat hard done by that their equally vital work was going unnoticed by the British public and was summed up eloquently, although with natural overstatement by one Bomber Command veteran and quoted in Stephen Bungay's excellent work, The Most Dangerous Enemy:

"There was no fighter Battle of Britain. I was at Lympne in light bombers in 1940. There was some fighter activity overhead but no more than you would expect. We went out every night, destroying the German invasion barges in the Channel Ports. That was why the Germans never came. We fought the real Battle of Britain."

Despite this, the fighter battle continued and on Sunday September 15th 1940, whilst having breakfast at Chequers, Churchill decided once again to visit Uxbridge. By now, the Blitz on London had started and the Premier had decided that the weather being fine, that it was a "Blitzy Day" to use his own phrase. At just after 11 a.m., the British Chain Home radar at Dover picked up the first raid of the day forming up over Calais. During the day, some 1,120 German fighters and bombers would be pitted against 630 Hurricanes and Spitfires of Fighter Command. 

Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory (IWM)

As the first raid approached the Kent coast, Keith Park deployed his forces with his customary skill and this time because of the numbers approaching, he requested 12 Group's involvement and ordered the Duxford Wing to patrol over Hornchurch. Leigh-Mallory and Park had clashed over tactics during the Battle of Britain. The New Zealander Park was anxious to hit the attackers with smaller numbers of squadrons and break up the enemy formations before they reached their targets, whereas Leigh-Mallory believed in attacking in large numbers and it was irrelevant to him whether or not the bombers had reached their targets. In reality, Park's tactics were the correct ones - the 'Big Wing' frequently took too long to assemble and then had to climb to reach it's designated height and often being led by the brave but maverick Douglas Bader, the Wing would frequently not patrol where ordered, but would go where Bader felt the action should be. 

The bottom line was that Park did not really trust Leigh-Mallory and although Park's tactics would win out in the Battle of Britain, in the longer term, his 12 Group counterpart would be the winner. Because of his closeness to Sholto Douglas at the Air Ministry, Leigh-Mallory would replace Park at 11 Group and eventually indeed, take the top job of AOC Fighter Command. All this was in the future but it was just as well for Britain and the RAF that he was a more peripheral figure at this stage of the Battle.

Sir Keith Park (IWM)

To return to September 15th, Churchill watched as it became clear that the Luftwaffe formations were indeed heading towards London. This was the day of Sergeant Ray Holmes' collision with what turned out to be an abandoned German bomber, a fact obviously unknown to him at the time. The attacking force, whilst not exactly routed, suffered heavy losses all the same; eighteen German aircraft had been shot down, representing 12.5% of their strength. However, due to massive overclaiming on the part of the RAF, especially the Big Wing, the claims had been for eighty one aircraft. The bomber brought down in the collision with Ray Holmes' Hurricane had been claimed nine times! This overclaiming was not deliberate but was understandable in the melee of a pitched battle. Dowding and Park realised this and had previously sought to take a more measured approach when dealing with claims - matching claims against wrecks of crashed aircraft was one way of doing this for example. Leigh-Mallory and his Air Ministry friends realised it too but on this occasion chose to ignore the overclaiming, partially for propaganda purposes but also to further their own ambitions to oust Dowding and Park for their own ends. The afternoon's air fighting saw similar overclaiming and by the end of the day, the RAF had claimed an incredible 185 German aircraft for the loss of 28 RAF machines. The actual German losses were 56 - still a resounding defeat but hardly decisive. 

Park was furious when he learned that these inflated figures had been released. He understood as well as anyone the need for maintaining the morale of the British public but he also knew what else lay behind these figures; of the 185 claims, no fewer than 105 of them came from the Duxford 'Big Wing!' 

When Churchill spoke to Park upon leaving the Uxbridge bunker, he was once again profoundly moved - he had seen the RAF's fighters handled with great skill by Park and his controllers and with great bravery in the air by the pilots. Park explained to Churchill that he was still not satisfied with the outcome and that he was disappointed that the German bombers had reached London. That was not good enough for Park but Churchill was impressed, especially with the claims from the Big Wing. They were beginning to be noticed.

As Stephen Bungay says, Fighter Command did not win the Battle of Britain on September 15th - it had done that already. It had won because it had endured the battles in August when it's airfields were attacked by repairing damaged machines, filling in craters on airfields and because of the faulty tactics of their enemy. It had won because it had enough brave pilots who overcame their own fears and doubts and it had won because of leaders like Keith Park and Hugh Dowding, who would soon be shamefully replaced by Trafford Leigh-Mallory and Sholto Douglas.

September 15th merely encapsulated this victory that had already been won - forgetting the overclaims, the appearance of the Big Wing over London, whilst not an effective military weapon in it's own right, made a massive psychological impact on the Luftwaffe's crews. They had been led to believe that the RAF was on it's knees and down to it's last fifty Spitfires. On the contrary, they had appeared stronger than ever and as the Luftwaffe could not master the skies over Britain, the proposed invasion of this country was never going to be a viable prospect. Operation Sealion was postponed indefinitely on September 17th 1940, just two days after the day we now commemorate as Battle of Britain Day.

For this reason if for no other, The Few deserve to be mythologised. Lest we forget.

Published Sources:

Churchill - Roy Jenkins, Pan Macmillan 2001

Dowding of Fighter Command - Vincent Orange, Grub Street 2008

The Most Dangerous Enemy - Stephen Bungay, Aurum Press 2001

The Narrow Margin - Derek Wood with Derek Dempster, Tri-Service Press 1990

Park - Vincent Orange, Grub Street 2001

My Thoughts on "Darkest Hour"

Warning: Contains some spoilers:

As there have been two decent Second World War related films released in the past twelve months, I thought that following on from my review of Dunkirk in July of last year then I should perhaps share my thoughts on Darkest Hour the new film which loosely covers the first twenty three days of Winston Churchill's Premiership from his taking the job upon Neville Chamberlain's resignation on 9 May 1940 until towards the end of the Dunkirk evacuation when it became apparent that the bulk of the British Expeditionary Force was going to be saved.

Before going any further, it should be remembered that as with Dunkirk, this film is not a documentary, it is a film and therefore plays fast and loose with historical fact on occasions as well as employing one or two fairly creaky links to the plot.

Gary Oldman's performance as Churchill is quite magnificent and he simply dominates the film. The supporting performances are strong too, with Kristin Scott-Thomas as Clementine Churchill, Ronald Pickup as Chamberlain and Samuel West as Anthony Eden, particularly worthy of note.

The film opens with what proved to Chamberlain's final appearance as Prime Minister in the House of Commons and this leads to my first minor gripe as to the accuracy of the film. During the debate, the Leader of the Opposition, Clement Attlee (played by David Schofield) refers to Chamberlain by name; this of course is never allowed in the House as members are referred to as "Members" or "Right Honourable Members" but never by name. Also the Chamber of the House of Commons appears in a very strange sort of gloomy half-light, no doubt for dramatic purposes but in no way a true representation. Attlee also comes across as a somewhat weak and vacillating character, when in reality, he was a staunch anti-Nazi and supporter of Churchill as Prime Minister.

Lord Halifax (played by Stephen Dillane) and Chamberlain to a lesser extent are played very much as the villains of the piece, constantly trying to undermine the new Prime Minister and working behind his back to negotiate a separate peace. The reality of it was that whilst Halifax did indeed favour a negotiated settlement, he didn't go behind Churchill's back and Chamberlain, whilst he didn't wholly approve of Churchill, didn't actively try to undermine him for his own political ends as is shown in the film. 

It is true that Winston Churchill did have an initially tricky relationship with King George VI (sympathetically played here by Ben Mendelsohn) but the King did warm to his new Prime Minister and they eventually became very close friends. Whether the circumstances of the King's epiphany were as depicted in the film, one has to doubt.

The film does show Churchill's decisive nature well - firing off instructions and "Action this Day" memos to all and sundry, although the notion that Operation Dynamo, as the Dunkirk Evacuation was code named, was Churchill's own idea is quite false. Like the Dunkirk film reviewed in July, this movie also perpetuates the myth that the BEF was saved entirely by the "Little Ships" when in reality, only some 5-7 percent of the men were evacuated this way, with the vast majority being rescued by the Royal Navy's warships and the larger transport ships requisitioned from the Merchant Navy.

Darkest Hour does touch on what Churchill called his 'Black Dog' - his momentary periods of depression and self-doubt but this in turn leads to what this writer feels is the biggest hole in the script. At no point did the Prime Minister ever disappear down in to the London Underground to canvass the opinion of the British public as to whether to continue the war, or to sit down and negotiate with Hitler. Also, what in reality should be a less than five minute journey from St James Park to Westminster seems to last an eternity whilst Churchill seeks the opinion of almost everyone in the carriage!

The film does correctly show Churchill's meeting with members of his 'Outer Cabinet' in which he gauged their opinion, effectively outmanoeuvring any lingering opposition to his policy of fighting on and which culminates in his now famous "We shall never surrender" speech in the House on 4 June 1940.

There is a lot more to this film that the incidents described above and despite my quibbles, it remains a superb piece of film making, which I thoroughly recommend to you. If Gary Oldman should win a Best Actor Oscar for his performance as Churchill, it will be one of the most well-deserved and popular wins ever.

Defending the Heart - a visit to RAF Uxbridge

Gate Guardian at RAF Uxbridge is this replica Hurricane in 303 Polish Squadron colours (author's photo)

Early in November, I was lucky enough to pay a visit to the RAF 11 Group Ops Room, more popularly known as the Battle of Britain Bunker at RAF Uxbridge in Middlesex, which was responsible for the air defence of London and the Southeast of England and as such carried the motto 'Tutela Cordis' which translates to 'Defence of the Heart.'

No. 11 Group was part of RAF Fighter Command and was an integral part of what became known as the 'Dowding System', named after Fighter Command's first Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief and the man who, with a committee led by Henry Tizard, developed what was the first interlocking command, control and communication network. This comprised of a system of Fighter Groups, Squadrons and Sector Stations, linked to the radar, observer posts, anti-aircraft guns, balloon control all controlled from Fighter Command HQ at Bentley Priory, near Stanmore in Middlesex.

It was a work of genius, which was a cornerstone of British victory during the Battle of Britain and of which the Luftwaffe were never fully aware and who never understood its significance.

The Memorial at RAF Uxbridge (author's photo)

The Groups were the second link in the communication chain and filtered down all of the information received through to the individual sector stations within their respective groups, whilst passing the information up to Command HQ at Stanmore. Today, the 11 Group Ops Room is open to the public, currently by appointment only and has been recreated to appear exactly as it did during the Battle of Britain, more specifically for around 11:30 on Sunday 15 September 1940, the day we now commemorate as Battle of Britain Day.

Appointments are necessary because the nature of the bunker makes space restricted and therefore limits the size of the groups that can be accommodated. My appointment made, I arrived a little before 14:00 having made the short walk from Uxbridge Underground Station through the former RAF Station, much of which is currently being developed into a new housing estate. On formation in 1936, the 11 Group Ops Room was located within Hillingdon House but this was a temporary measure as it was realised from the outset that any such nerve centre would need to remain impervious to enemy air attack.

The bunker was constructed by the well known construction company Sir Robert McAlpine under conditions of strict secrecy between February and August 1939 and was thus available in the nick of time for war. The bunker is sixty feet beneath the ground and was designed to be immune to the heaviest bombs of the period. It was also designed with attack by poison gas in mind and contains a gas filtration system (which is still functioning to this day) which ensures that breathable air is available at all times to those working within the complex.

On the afternoon of my visit, we had a small group of three people booked, one of whom was a 'no show' and thus, our small party of two, led by Bob, our enthusiastic and knowlegeable guide, began the descent of the first flight of 87 steps down to the Ops Room.

The first of 87 steps down - and back up! (author's photo)

As we were a small group on the day, Bob was first able to show us the gas filtration room, which after 78 years still functions perfectly well. Our next port of call was the checkpoint, which today is recreated by an RAF Regiment Guard in mannequin form, together with a rack of 0.303 rifles and a secure grill to prevent unauthorised entry. Understandably, given the secret nature of this site in 1940, entry was strictly governed by pass only. Bob explained that it was here that the Ops Room suffered its only fatal casualty of the Second World War when a WRAF was killed by a rifle which fired as it was being cleaned by one of the duty guards, killing her instantly.

The Check Point entrance to the Ops Room (author's photo)

With this sobering thought in mind, we descended further down two more flights of stairs until at last, we reached the bottom level. Bob explained that the bunker has always had a problem with flooding, although during the years that it was operational, the space was manned around the clock and could be adequately controlled. This is not always the case today and Bob showed us the mark left by a summer thunderstorm in July 2015 which left the complex shoulder deep in water.

Bob shows us the 2015 flood level marked on the door frame (author's photo)

Having reached the Ops Room proper, although I had never visited before, it was a strangely familiar sight. This was because I had seen it (so I thought) in many films, perhaps most notably in the 1969 classic Battle of Britain and I asked Bob about this filming. It transpired that the film hadn't been shot in the Bunker, because at this time RAF Uxbridge was still an operational station and in any case, the Ops Room in its 1940 form was non-existent at that time. A team from the production company visited, took meticulous measurements and aided by photographs of the complex taken during the war, faithfully recreated the complex at Pinewood Studios - and so myths are demolished!

The 'Tote Board' and Plot Table (author's photo)

The Gallery - VIPs were accomodated on the far left (author's photo)

The main Ops Room is dominated on one side by the vast 'Tote Board' which fills one wall and by the elevated desks and the curved glass of the gallery on the other. The desks were occupied by the 'Tellers' who were in constant contact with the Sector Stations, Radar Stations etc. and the Gallery was home to the Duty Controller and the AOC, who during the Battle of Britain was Air Vice Marshal Keith Park. The glass protection was a must, as the main Ops Room, with it's legion of Tellers, WRAF 'croupiers' on the Plot and the constant ringing of telephones, was a noisy place and the Controllers up above needed a modicum of quiet in order to take the momentous decisions needed to control the battle.

Bob immediately set about explaining the Tote Board and its complexities. It was designed to display all of the relevant information at a glance. The place names displayed prominently across the top and bottom of the board - TANGMERE, NORTH WEALD, HORNCHURCH, KENLEY, BIGGIN HILL, DEBDEN and NORTHOLT - are the Sector Stations for 11 Group. The numbers displayed beneath each Sector Station are the squadrons assigned to each sector, for example for Northolt we see 1 (Canadian), 303 (Polish), 229, 504 and 264 B Flight, which was a night-fighter squadron at this period of the Battle and is thus shown as 'Released' on the Tote Board, as it is set for 11:30 on 15 September 1940. The descriptions beneath each squadron, such as 'Available in 30 minutes' etc., show the readiness state of each of those squadrons. The meaning of the coloured lights relates to the colours shown on the clock face, so for example with the clock at 11:30, the minute hand has just passed the 'blue' section on the clock face, so if the light is illuminated in blue, the controllers know at a glance that this is up to date information, if in yellow then ten minute old information, red fifteen minutes and so on, with the lights being lit in sequence. At the bottom of the status list, we then see the words 'State of Squadrons' - this is simple with 'P' equating to pilots and 'A' for aircraft, so again we can see at a glance that 1 (Canadian) Squadron at this precise point had 23 pilots but only 13 aircraft, 303 (Polish) 21 pilots and 17 aircraft and so on across the squadrons.

Weather and Balloon Status was also shown (author's photo)

Nothing was left to chance and the lower part of the Tote Board displayed the weather and visibility across all Fighter Command airfields and so apart from the Sector Stations, we now saw other familiar names from the Battle of Britain such as Hendon, Croydon and Martlesham Heath on display. For example, the cloud status was 8/10 cloud cover at 18,000 feet above Biggin Hill and visibility of three miles. The green disks told at a glance that the airfield was open - a red would indicated a temporary closure and a red/green would indicate usable with care. The status of the balloon barrage was shown, with the heights of the barrages at Dover, Gravesend, Tilbury and London all shown.

The Plot Table set for 11:30 on Sunday 15 September 1940 (author's photo)

Moving to the Plot Table, the same principal of showing at a glance the age and therefore the validity of the information to hand applied. Looking at the photograph immediately above, three raids can be seen heading across the Channel; these are marked 'H' for Hostile and the number '04' for example, signifies that it is the fourth hostile raid detected so far that day. The figure in red below indicates the number of aircraft in the raid, either based on the radar operator's judgement, or as observed by a member of the Royal Observer Corps. The arrows behind the raids are coloured according to the clock face, so in this instance a blue arrow represents the most up-to-date and therefore accurate information available and by looking at the progression of arrows, it is possible to plot the course of the raids as they head towards the English coast. The RAF fighter squadrons being deployed in response to the raid are shown in similar fashion, with the squadron numbers displayed on yellow flags atop the  wooden blocks, so we see that the first squadrons likely to intercept are 92 and 72 Squadrons, which comprise of twenty aircraft and which are patrolling at a height of 25,000 feet, in other words, with the advantage of height. Other squadrons are shown at various points, either patrolling over airfields, or ready to intercept before the raiders reached London. In the distance, just over the demarcation line between 11 and 12 Groups is a formation marked 'W' which shows fifty five aircraft patrolling at 20,000 feet. This is the Duxford Wing, or the "Big Wing" of 12 Group, which although it had let down Park in 11 Group earlier in the battle by appearing too late to be effective, on this day it was to have a devastating psychological effect on the Luftwaffe by appearing in large numbers, just at a time when the German pilots had been led to believe that the RAF was on its last legs.

From the Plot Room, we moved upstairs to the gallery area behind the curved glass. Part of this is still laid out with the desk for the Duty Controller, which during the Battle of Britain was Air Commodore Baron Willoughby de Broke, who during the Battle of Britain always ensured that he was available and never missed a single day's action. An interesting fact relayed by Bob our guide, was that contrary to popular belief, no RAF personnel slept in the bunker at any point during the war, the only person being allowed to do so was the duty GPO telephone engineer, so vital was it to maintain communications with the outside world and the 11 Group airfields in particular. Another interesting point of interest is that the map on display is the original dating from 1940, which when the Ops Room was restored to it's original Battle of Britain configuration in the mid-1980s, was found rolled up in a storeroom, gathering dust!

The view down from the Gallery (author's photo)

The remainder of the Gallery, along with many of the adjoining former offices, has been converted into a most attractive and interesting museum, housing models, uniforms, medals and memorabilia from the RAF's Second World War history and beyond. This was largely the work of Warrant Officer 'Chris' Wren MBE, who whilst stationed at RAF Uxbridge for the final nine years of his RAF career, took it upon himself to restore the Ops Room to it's former glory and made it a personal mission to achieve this end. Chris is now retired from the RAF and from overseeing the Ops Room but he can be extremely proud of the end result.

During the Battle of Britain, Winston Churchill was a frequent visitor and would sit in the VIP area of the Gallery watching the day's events unfold and indeed, it was following a visit on 16 August 1940 that he was so moved by what he seen, that he began to pen the speech that would include the now immortal phrase "Never in the field of human conflict, was so much owed, by so many to so few."
Churchill was again present on 15 September 1940, the day we see frozen in time at the Ops Room today but the Bunker was visited by many other VIPs during the war, including Field Marshal Montgomery and General Dwight D Eisenhower.

Air Raid Siren formerly mounted on the roof of Hillingdon House (author's photo)

Babys' Gas Mask (author's photo)

Other parts of the Museum are dedicated to the Royal Observer Corps, Bomber Command and to RAF Uxbridge. A slick looking new Visitor Centre is currently under construction outside in the grounds which is due to open in February 2018 and it is to be hoped that this new facility doesn't detract from the charm of the current arrangements too much. There is also a Lecture Theatre, and whilst we were undertaking our visit, watched a fascinating film made especially for the RAF in 1990 which highlighted the work of 11 Group. Bob mentioned that for school groups, who are also catered for here, he frequently shows the classic documentary "London Can Take It!" which dates from 1940.

Of course, the 11 Group Ops Room was at the centre of events other than the Battle of Britain, although this was undoubtedly it's 'Finest Hour' to coin a phrase. The subsequent fighter sweeps, known as 'Rhubarbs', a costly strategy envisioned by Keith Park's successor Trafford Leigh-Mallory, who had intrigued for the 11 Group AOC's post, were all controlled from here, as were the air operations for another ill-advised mission, the Dieppe Raid in 1942. The culminating moment came in 1944, when the air operations for Operation Overlord, the D-Day Landings were all controlled from the 11 Group Bunker and today a replica Spitfire Mk IX in "Invasion Stripes" acts as the joint gate guardian with the Hurricane to represent the two pinnacles in the Ops Room's history.

Replica Spitfire Mk IX gate guardian (author's photo)

The Battle of Britain Bunker in it's present format is open by appointment only until Friday 22 December 2017, after which point it will close until the new Visitor Centre opens in February next year. I highly recommend paying a visit and details as to how to book can be made by checking out the Museum Website as per this link. If you can, visit before the closure so that you can see the current arrangements before it is too late!

The First Day of the War: September 3rd 1939

Preparing for War - 1938 (author's photo)

"This morning, the British Ambassador in Berlin handed the German Government a final note stating that unless the British Government heard from them by 11 o'clock that they were prepared at once to withdraw their troops from Poland, a state of war would exist between us. I have to tell you now that no such assurance has been received, and that consequently this country is at war with Germany."

Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain addressed the British people at 11:15 on that fateful Sunday morning and his words are well known now but reactions around the world varied greatly as might be expected.

In Berlin, the British ultimatum was read aloud to Hitler by Dr. Schmidt, the official translator at the German Foreign Ministry. The Fuhrer sat immobile and gazed in silence. After what seemed a long interval, he turned to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, who was also present and asked "What now?" According to Schmidt, Hitler had a savage look to his face, as though implying that Ribbentrop had misled him as to the probable British reaction. Ribbentrop answered quietly "I assume that the French will hand in a similar ultimatum within the hour."

In London, even before Chamberlain had spoken, the Royal Navy sent the simple cable "TOTAL GERMANY" to it's ships and bases around the world, followed that evening by a further signal "WINSTON IS BACK" advising, or perhaps warning the fleet that Winston Churchill had been reappointed to his First World War role as First Lord of the Admiralty. 

Advice on Shelters (author's photo)

Barely had the Prime Minister finished speaking, when at 11:27 in London, the mournful note of the air raid sirens, which were to become so familiar over the coming almost six years, announced to the capital that an air raid was imminent. Many Londoners, perhaps remembering Stanley Baldwin's assertion that "The Bomber will always get through" reinforced by having read or seen the movie version of HG Wells' 'The Shape of Things to Come' doubtless felt that this might be the beginning of an apocalyptic future for London as outlined by the likes of Bertrand Russell, or indeed the British Air Staff, who in 1938 predicted that 3,500 tons of bombs could fall on London in the first twenty four hours of a future conflict, causing 58,000 fatal casualties and many more injured. Others were doubtless more sanguine but almost everyone was afraid to a greater or lesser degree, although most kept their fear well concealed. In fact, the alert was a false alarm, caused by a French aircraft which had stumbled into Britain's air defence system. The first air raids on London would not come until a year later and although the raids when they did come would naturally bring death and destruction, the consequences were never as remotely devastating as had been predicted. The 58,000 figure of fatalities confidently predicted for London in 1938, was only just exceeded (by 2,000) across the entire country for the duration of the war.

The spectre of Poison Gas (author's photo)

 

Around the World, the British Empire and Commonwealth followed suit - the idea of Britain as 'The Mother Country' seems quaint and outdated today but it was something that still held sway in 1939. Australia and New Zealand declared war immediately, with New Zealand Prime Minister Michael Savage memorably stating of Britain that "Where she goes, we go!" South Africa at first demurred from declaring war and wished to remain neutral, but the Government was defeated in a parliamentary vote and the new Prime Minister, Jan Smuts, declared war on Germany on September 6th. The Canadian Government followed on September 10th.

In Washington DC, President Roosevelt broadcast to the American people hours after the British and French declaration of war and although he had to tread carefully at this stage to preserve American neutrality, Roosevelt nailed his colours clearly to the mast in his intention to stand firm with the democracies of Europe.

"This nation will remain a neutral nation, but I cannot ask that every American remains neutral in thought as well. Even a neutral has a right to take account of the facts. Even a neutral cannot close his mind or his conscience."

As yet unknown to his listeners, the President had already resolved to recall Congress so that his Administration could seek a repeal of the arms embargo and at least passively support the democracies against the Nazi regime.

Confirming the news (author's collection)

Even at this early stage of the war, Hitler was anxious about possible American involvement and his anxiety must have been further increased when news reached him that the war had taken it's first casualties in the North Atlantic, when the liner Athenia was torpedoed by the U-30 at 19:43 that same evening. The vessel was carrying 1,103 passengers, including some 300 American citizens anxious to escape the war now overwhelming Europe and who were returning home via the liner's intended destination of Montreal. 

Mindful perhaps of keeping America out of the war and convinced that Britain and France would soon be looking for a political solution anyway, Hitler had already ordered that passenger ships carrying passengers were to be allowed to proceed in safety, even if part of a convoy but Fritz Julius Lemp, in command of U-30 did not bother to check on the credentials of the Athenia and ordered the firing of a salvo of torpedoes at the defenceless liner. Lemp then compounded his error by surfacing and opening fire on the stricken vessel in an attempt to shoot away her wireless aerials. It was at this point, with lifeboats obviously being filled with passengers that the U-Boat commander realized that he had sunk a passenger ship both in violation of International Law and his Fuhrer's order but he made no attempt to atone for his error and merely submerged without offering any assistance. 

The liner had in fact, sent out a distress signal and was remarkably still just about afloat by the time that rescue vessels arrived on the scene, although she sank later the following morning. The 118 persons killed were the first casualties of the Battle of the Atlantic and included 22 American citizens, which caused outrage in the United States and set the majority of public opinion in that country against the Germans from the outset.

Back in England, aside from the Royal Navy's instructions to the fleet, the other services were taking practical steps to take the war to Germany. At RAF Scampton in Lincolnshire that evening, six Hampden bombers of 89 Squadron under the command of Squadron leader Leonard Snaith took off to attack German warships at the great naval base at Wilhelmshaven. An earlier reconnaissance flight by a single Blenheim bomber from RAF Wyton had confirmed the presence of German warships but the failure of the aircraft's wireless to operate at 24,000 feet had caused a delay in reporting the fact until after it's return to base.

The raid, such as it was, was a fiasco; the crews had already been given strict instructions not to bomb civilian establishments, either houses or dockyards and therefore could only bomb the warships if they were at anchor in the harbour rather than alongside for fear of hitting buildings rather than the ships. As they approached Wilhelmshaven, the weather, already poor, became even worse and the cloudbase dropped to 100 feet. Not really knowing for sure where his squadron was, Snaith took the only decision open to him and turned his squadron for home, dumping their bombs into the sea en route. They eventually reached Scampton at 22:30 but fortunately everyone made it home on this occasion. Those on the follow up raids ordered the next day would not be so fortunate; of the fourteen Wellingtons and fifteen Blenheims despatched, five of the Blenheims were shot down and although they managed to land three bombs on the Admiral Scheer, all of these failed to explode. Ten of the Wellingtons became hopelessly lost and some dropped their bombs on the Danish city of Esbjerg, some 110 miles off target, where they killed two people. Clearly, the RAF had much to learn but at least had tried to take some offensive action.

Churchill in defiant mood (IWM)

The Army had already begun to implement plans for a British Expeditionary Force to be sent to France some ten hours before the declaration of war, when the passenger ship Isle of Thanet sailed from Southampton to Cherbourg with the first advance party of what was to become a sizeable force of over 300,000 men, the majority of whom would be evacuated from France less than a year later.

The conflict at sea was a shooting war from the outset but apart from this and some further costly efforts by the RAF in attempting to bomb German naval targets in daylight without fighter protection, the war was soon to settle down into a period of relative inertia known to the British as 'The Phoney War', the French as 'Drole de Guerre' ('Funny War') or in Germany as 'Sitzkrieg' ('Sitting War.')

This somewhat surreal period was typified by an approach to the war that seems farcical now - for example, when British MP Leo Amery proposed that the RAF drop incendiary bombs on the Black Forest, in order to destroy stocks of ammunition thought to be stockpiled there, he received the reply from Sir Kingsley Wood, Secretary of State of Air, that the Forest was 'private property' and therefore could not be attacked. Wood also stated that armaments factories could not be bombed for the same reason and that furthermore, such attacks might provoke the Germans to mount similar attacks on British factories. The activities of the RAF's bomber force was soon to be limited to dropping leaflets on German cities which no doubt had little effect on the civilian population other than increasing their supplies of scrap paper. 

The Phoney War period was to end suddenly with the Norwegian Campaign in April 1940, one consequence of which was the downfall of Chamberlain's Government and it's replacement with a coalition Administration under Churchill, which saw the country through the dark days of the Fall of France and Low Countries, followed by the evacuations from Dunkirk and the Channel Ports to the defiance of the Battle of Britain and The Blitz and which would eventually see the country to victory in 1945.

Published Sources:

The Battle of the Atlantic - John Costello & Terry Hughes, Collins 1977

The Battle of Heligoland Bight 1939 - Robin Holmes, Grub Street 2009

BEF Ships before, at and after Dunkirk - John de S Winser, World Ship Society 1999

Bomber Boys - Patrick Bishop, Harper Press 2007

London at War 1939-1945 - Philip Ziegler, Pimlico 2002

The World at War - Mark Arnold-Foster, Collins 1973

Their Finest Hour: The Battle of Britain

Winston Churchill in 1940 (IWM)

 

July 10th 1940 is the date most commonly agreed upon by historians as that which marks the opening of the First Phase of the Battle of Britain. It would be impossible in a blog of this nature to summarize the entire Battle in one post - after all, very many authors of high repute have devoted entire books to the subject and sometimes just to cover one day of the Battle, such was it's vastness in scope and it's importance to the survival of not only this country but the Free World as a whole.

In the coming weeks and months, we shall once again look at various aspects of the Battle of Britain in this blog but for now, let us examine the speech that introduced the phrase "Battle of Britain" into the consciousness of the British people and to World history. It is perhaps sometimes forgotten that it was Winston Churchill who first used the phrase in the closing part of a 36 minute speech to the House of Commons on June 18th 1940 on the state of the war following the imminent Fall of France. The date marked the 125th anniversary of the Battle of Waterloo and when Churchill first used the phrase 'Battle of Britain', he could have only but hoped that the outcome of this battle would be as favourable as that which had taken place in 1815.

The speech is repeated verbatim below:

"I spoke the other day of the colossal military disaster which occurred when the French High Command failed to withdraw the northern Armies from Belgium at the moment when they knew that the French front was decisively broken at Sedan and on the Meuse. This delay entailed the loss of fifteen or sixteen French divisions and threw out of action for the critical period the whole of the British Expeditionary Force. Our Army and 120,000 French troops were indeed rescued by the British Navy from Dunkirk but only with the loss of their cannon, vehicles and modern equipment. This loss inevitably took some weeks to repair, and in the first two of those weeks the battle in France has been lost. When we consider the heroic resistance made by the French Army against heavy odds in this battle, the enormous losses inflicted upon the enemy and the evident exhaustion of the enemy, it may well be the thought that these 25 divisions of the best-trained and best-equipped troops might have turned the scale. However, General Weygand had to fight without them. Only three British divisions or their equivalent were able to stand in the line with their French comrades. They have suffered severely, but they have fought well. We sent every man we could to France as fast as we could re-equip and transport their formations.

I am not reciting these facts for the purpose of recrimination. That I judge to be utterly futile and even harmful. We cannot afford it. I recite them in order to explain why it was we did not have, as we could have had, between twelve and fourteen British divisions fighting in the line in this great battle instead of only three. Now I put all this aside. I put it on the shelf, from which the historians, when they have time, will select their documents to tell their stories. We have to think of the future and not of the past. This also applies in a small way to our own affairs at home. There are many who would hold an inquest in the House of Commons on the conduct of the Governments-and of Parliaments, for they are in it, too-during the years which led up to this catastrophe. They seek to indict those who were responsible for the guidance of our affairs. This also would be a foolish and pernicious process. There are too many in it. Let each man search his conscience and search his speeches. I frequently search mine.

Of this I am quite sure, that if we open a quarrel between the past and the present, we shall find that we have lost the future. Therefore, I cannot accept the drawing of any distinctions between Members of the present Government. It was formed at a moment of crisis in order to unite all the Parties and all sections of opinion. It has received the almost unanimous support of both Houses of Parliament. Its Members are going to stand together, and, subject to the authority of the House of Commons, we are going to govern the country and fight the war. It is absolutely necessary at a time like this that every Minister who tries each day to do his duty shall be respected; and their subordinates must know that their chiefs are not threatened men, men who are here today and gone tomorrow, but that their directions must be punctually and faithfully obeyed. Without this concentrated power we cannot face what lies before us. I should not think it would be very advantageous for the House to prolong this Debate this afternoon under conditions of public stress. Many facts are not clear that will be clear in a short time. We are to have a secret Session on Thursday, and I should think that would be a better opportunity for the many earnest expressions of opinion which Members will desire to make and for the House to discuss vital matters without having everything read the next morning by our dangerous foes.

 The disastrous military events which have happened during the past fortnight have not come to me with any sense of surprise. Indeed, I indicated a fortnight ago as clearly as I could to the House that the worst possibilities were open; and I made it perfectly clear then that whatever happened in France would make no difference to the resolve of Britain and the British Empire to fight on, 'if necessary for years, if necessary alone.' During the last few days we have successfully brought off the great majority of the troops we had on the line of communication in France; and seven-eighths of the troops we have sent to France since the beginning of the war-that is to say, about 350,000 out of 400,000 men-are safely back in this country. Others are still fighting with the French, and fighting with considerable success in their local encounters against the enemy. We have also brought back a great mass of stores, rifles and munitions of all kinds which had been accumulated in France during the last nine months.

We have, therefore, in this Island today a very large and powerful military force. This force comprises all our best-trained and our finest troops, including scores of thousands of those who have already measured their quality against the Germans and found themselves at no disadvantage. We have under arms at the present time in this Island over a million and a quarter men. Behind these we have the Local Defence Volunteers, numbering half a million, only a portion of whom, however, are yet armed with rifles or other firearms. We have incorporated into our Defence Forces every man for whom we have a weapon. We expect very large additions to our weapons in the near future, and in preparation for this we intend forthwith to call up, drill and train further large numbers. Those who are not called up, or else are employed during the vast business of munitions production in all its branches-and their ramifications are innumerable-will serve their country best by remaining at their ordinary work until they receive their summons. We have also over here Dominions armies. The Canadians had actually landed in France, but have now been safely withdrawn, much disappointed, but in perfect order, with all their artillery and equipment. And these very high-class forces from the Dominions will now take part in the defence of the Mother Country.

Lest the account which I have given of these large forces should raise the question: Why did they not take part in the great battle in France? I must make it clear that, apart from the divisions training and organizing at home, only 12 divisions were equipped to fight upon a scale which justified their being sent abroad. And this was fully up to the number which the French had been led to expect would be available in France at the ninth month of the war. The rest of our forces at home have a fighting value for home defence which will, of course, steadily increase every week that passes. Thus, the invasion of Great Britain would at this time require the transportation across the sea of hostile armies on a very large scale, and after they had been so transported they would have to be continually maintained with all the masses of munitions and supplies which are required for continuous battle-as continuous battle it will surely be.

Here is where we come to the Navy-and after all, we have a Navy. Some people seem to forget that we have a Navy. We must remind them. For the last thirty years I have been concerned in discussions about the possibilities of oversea invasion, and I took the responsibility on behalf of the Admiralty, at the beginning of the last war, of allowing all regular troops to be sent out of the country. That was a very serious step to take, because our Territorials had only just been called up and were quite untrained. Therefore, this Island was for several months particularly denuded of fighting troops. The Admiralty had confidence at that time in their ability to prevent a mass invasion even though at that time the Germans had a magnificent battle fleet in the proportion of 10 to 16, even though they were capable of fighting a general engagement every day and any day, whereas now they have only a couple of heavy ships worth speaking of-the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau. We are also told that the Italian Navy is to come out and gain sea superiority in these waters. If they seriously intend it, I shall only say that we shall be delighted to offer Signor Mussolini a free and safeguarded passage through the Strait of Gibraltar in order that he may play the part to which he aspires. There is a general curiosity in the British Fleet to find out whether the Italians are up to the level they were at in the last war or whether they have fallen off at all.

Therefore, it seems to me that as far as sea-borne invasion on a great scale is concerned, we are far more capable of meeting it today than we were at many periods in the last war and during the early months of this war, before our other troops were trained, and while the B.E.F. had proceeded abroad. Now, the Navy have never pretended to be able to prevent raids by bodies of 5,000 or 10,000 men flung suddenly across and thrown ashore at several points on the coast some dark night or foggy morning. The efficacy of sea power, especially under modern conditions, depends upon the invading force being of large size; It has to be of large size, in view of our military strength, to be of any use. If it is of large size, then the Navy have something they can find and meet and, as it were, bite on. Now, we must remember that even five divisions, however lightly equipped, would require 200 to 250 ships, and with modern air reconnaissance and photography it would not be easy to collect such an armada, marshal it, and conduct it across the sea without any powerful naval forces to escort it; and there would be very great possibilities, to put it mildly, that this armada would be intercepted long before it reached the coast, and all the men drowned in the sea or, at the worst blown to pieces with their equipment while they were trying to land. We also have a great system of minefields, recently strongly reinforced, through which we alone know the channels. If the enemy tries to sweep passages through these minefields, it will be the task of the Navy to destroy the mine-sweepers and any other forces employed to protect them. There should be no difficulty in this, owing to our great superiority at sea.

Those are the regular, well-tested, well-proved arguments on which we have relied during many years in peace and war. But the question is whether there are any new methods by which those solid assurances can be circumvented. Odd as it may seem, some attention has been given to this by the Admiralty, whose prime duty and responsibility is to destroy any large sea-borne expedition before it reaches, or at the moment when it reaches, these shores. It would not be a good thing for me to go into details of this. It might suggest ideas to other people which they have not thought of, and they would not be likely to give us any of their ideas in exchange. All I will say is that untiring vigilance and mind-searching must be devoted to the subject, because the enemy is crafty and cunning and full of novel treacheries and stratagems. The House may be assured that the utmost ingenuity is being displayed and imagination is being evoked from large numbers of competent officers, well-trained in tactics and thoroughly up to date, to measure and counterwork novel possibilities. Untiring vigilance and untiring searching of the mind is being, and must be, devoted to the subject, because, remember, the enemy is crafty and there is no dirty trick he will not do.

Some people will ask why, then, was it that the British Navy was not able to prevent the movement of a large army from Germany into Norway across the Skagerrak? But the conditions in the Channel and in the North Sea are in no way like those which prevail in the Skagerrak. In the Skagerrak, because of the distance, we could give no air support to our surface ships, and consequently, lying as we did close to the enemy's main air power, we were compelled to use only our submarines. We could not enforce the decisive blockade or interruption which is possible from surface vessels. Our submarines took a heavy toll but could not, by themselves, prevent the invasion of Norway. In the Channel and in the North Sea, on the other hand, our superior naval surface forces, aided by our submarines, will operate with close and effective air assistance.

This brings me, naturally, to the great question of invasion from the air, and of the impending struggle between the British and German Air Forces. It seems quite clear that no invasion on a scale beyond the capacity of our land forces to crush speedily is likely to take place from the air until our Air Force has been definitely overpowered. In the meantime, there may be raids by parachute troops and attempted descents of airborne soldiers. We should be able to give those gentry a warm reception both in the air and on the ground, if they reach it in any condition to continue the dispute. But the great question is: Can we break Hitler's air weapon? Now, of course, it is a very great pity that we have not got an Air Force at least equal to that of the most powerful enemy within striking distance of these shores. But we have a very powerful Air Force which has proved itself far superior in quality, both in men and in many types of machine, to what we have met so far in the numerous and fierce air battles which have been fought with the Germans. In France, where we were at a considerable disadvantage and lost many machines on the ground when they were standing round the aerodromes, we were accustomed to inflict in the air losses of as much as two and two-and-a-half to one. In the fighting over Dunkirk, which was a sort of no-man's-land, we undoubtedly beat the German Air Force, and gained the mastery of the local air, inflicting here a loss of three or four to one day after day. Anyone who looks at the photographs which were published a week or so ago of the re-embarkation, showing the masses of troops assembled on the beach and forming an ideal target for hours at a time, must realize that this re-embarkation would not have been possible unless the enemy had resigned all hope of recovering air superiority at that time and at that place.

In the defense of this Island the advantages to the defenders will be much greater than they were in the fighting around Dunkirk. We hope to improve on the rate of three or four to one which was realized at Dunkirk; and in addition all our injured machines and their crews which get down safely-and, surprisingly, a very great many injured machines and men do get down safely in modern air fighting-all of these will fall, in an attack upon these Islands, on friendly. soil and live to fight another day; whereas all the injured enemy machines and their complements will be total losses as far as the war is concerned.

During the great battle in France, we gave very powerful and continuous aid to. the French Army, both by fighters and bombers; but in spite of every kind of pressure we never would allow the entire metropolitan fighter strength of the Air Force to be consumed. This decision was painful, but it was also right, because the fortunes of the battle in France could not have been decisively affected even if we had thrown in our entire fighter force. That battle was lost by the unfortunate strategical opening, by the extraordinary and unforeseen power of the armored columns, and by the great preponderance of the German Army in numbers. Our fighter Air Force might easily have been exhausted as a mere accident in that great struggle, and then we should have found ourselves at the present time in a very serious plight. But as it is, I am happy to inform the House that our fighter strength is stronger at the present time relatively to the Germans, who have suffered terrible losses, than it has ever been; and consequently we believe ourselves possessed of the capacity to continue the war in the air under better conditions than we have ever experienced before. I look forward confidently to the exploits of our fighter pilots-these splendid men, this brilliant youth-who will have the glory of saving their native land, their island home, and all they love, from the most deadly of all attacks.

There remains, of course, the danger of bombing attacks, which will certainly be made very soon upon us by the bomber forces of the enemy. It is true that the German bomber force is superior in numbers to ours; but we have a very large bomber force also, which we shall use to strike at military targets in Germany without intermission. I do not at all underrate the severity of the ordeal which lies before us; but I believe our countrymen will show themselves capable of standing up to it, like the brave men of Barcelona, and will be able to stand up to it, and carry on in spite of it, at least as well as any other people in the world. Much will depend upon this; every man and every woman will have the chance to show the finest qualities of their race, and render the highest service to their cause. For all of us, at this time, whatever our sphere, our station, our occupation or our duties, it will be a help to remember the famous lines: He nothing common did or mean, Upon that memorable scene.

I have thought it right upon this occasion to give the House and the country some indication of the solid, practical grounds upon which we base our inflexible resolve to continue the war. There are a good many people who say, "Never mind. Win or lose, sink or swim, better die than submit to tyranny-and such a tyranny." And I do not dissociate myself from them. But I can assure them that our professional advisers of the three Services unitedly advise that we should carry on the war, and that there are good and reasonable hopes of final victory. We have fully informed and consulted all the self-governing Dominions, these great communities far beyond the oceans who have been built up on our laws and on our civilization, and who are absolutely free to choose their course, but are absolutely devoted to the ancient Motherland, and who feel themselves inspired by the same emotions which lead me to stake our all upon duty and honor. We have fully consulted them, and I have received from their Prime Ministers, Mr. Mackenzie King of Canada, Mr. Menzies of Australia, Mr. Fraser of New Zealand, and General Smuts of South Africa-that wonderful man, with his immense profound mind, and his eye watching from a distance the whole panorama of European affairs-I have received from all these eminent men, who all have Governments behind them elected on wide franchises, who are all there because they represent the will of their people, messages couched in the most moving terms in which they endorse our decision to fight on, and declare themselves ready to share our fortunes and to persevere to the end. That is what we are going to do.

We may now ask ourselves: In what way has our position worsened since the beginning of the war? It has worsened by the fact that the Germans have conquered a large part of the coast line of Western Europe, and many small countries have been overrun by them. This aggravates the possibilities of air attack and adds to our naval preoccupations. It in no way diminishes, but on the contrary definitely increases, the power of our long-distance blockade. Similarly, the entrance of Italy into the war increases the power of our long-distance blockade. We have stopped the worst leak by that. We do not know whether military resistance will come to an end in France or not, but should it do so, then of course the Germans will be able to concentrate their forces, both military and industrial, upon us. But for the reasons I have given to the House these will not be found so easy to apply. If invasion has become more imminent, as no doubt it has, we, being relieved from the task of maintaining a large army in France, have far larger and more efficient forces to meet it.

If Hitler can bring under his despotic control the industries of the countries he has conquered, this will add greatly to his already vast armament output. On the other hand, this will not happen immediately, and we are now assured of immense, continuous and increasing support in supplies and munitions of all kinds from the United States; and especially of aeroplanes and pilots from the Dominions and across the oceans coming from regions which are beyond the reach of enemy bombers.

I do not see how any of these factors can operate to our detriment on balance before the winter comes; and the winter will impose a strain upon the Nazi regime, with almost all Europe writhing and starving under its cruel heel, which, for all their ruthlessness, will run them very hard. We must not forget that from the moment when we declared war on the 3rd September it was always possible for Germany to turn all her Air Force upon this country, together with any other devices of invasion she might conceive, and that France could have done little or nothing to prevent her doing so. We have, therefore, lived under this danger, in principle and in a slightly modified form, during all these months. In the meanwhile, however, we have enormously improved our methods of defense, and we have learned what we had no right to assume at the beginning, namely, that the individual aircraft and the individual British pilot have a sure and definite superiority. Therefore, in casting up this dread balance sheet and contemplating our dangers with a disillusioned eye, I see great reason for intense vigilance and exertion, but none whatever for panic or despair.

During the first four years of the last war the Allies experienced nothing but disaster and disappointment. That was our constant fear: one blow after another, terrible losses, frightful dangers. Everything miscarried. And yet at the end of those four years the morale of the Allies was higher than that of the Germans, who had moved from one aggressive triumph to another, and who stood everywhere triumphant invaders of the lands into which they had broken. During that war we repeatedly asked ourselves the question: How are we going to win? and no one was able ever to answer it with much precision, until at the end, quite suddenly, quite unexpectedly, our terrible foe collapsed before us, and we were so glutted with victory that in our folly we threw it away.

We do not yet know what will happen in France or whether the French resistance will be prolonged, both in France and in the French Empire overseas. The French Government will be throwing away great opportunities and casting adrift their future if they do not continue the war in accordance with their Treaty obligations, from which we have not felt able to release them. The House will have read the historic declaration in which, at the desire of many Frenchmen-and of our own hearts-we have proclaimed our willingness at the darkest hour in French history to conclude a union of common citizenship in this struggle. However matters may go in France or with the French Government, or other French Governments, we in this Island and in the British Empire will never lose our sense of comradeship with the French people. If we are now called upon to endure what they have been suffering, we shall emulate their courage, and if final victory rewards our toils they shall share the gains, aye, and freedom shall be restored to all. We abate nothing of our just demands; not one jot or tittle do we recede. Czechs, Poles, Norwegians, Dutch, Belgians have joined their causes to our own. All these shall be restored.

What General Weygand called the Battle of France is over. I expect that the Battle of Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle depends the survival of Christian civilization. Upon it depends our own British life, and the long continuity of our institutions and our Empire. The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this Island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be free and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of perverted science. Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say, 'This was their finest hour.' "

Churchill's speeches were sometimes know for their exaggeration but on this occasion, this was not the case and even 75 years on, the consequences for the Free World of a British defeat in the Battle do not bear thinking about. The Battle of Britain was to demonstrate to the rest of the World, especially to the United States that Britain was not defeated and that the hitherto invincible Nazi war machine could be defeated and stopped. 

Even now, it is debatable as to whether Hitler really wanted an invasion of this country, or whether he felt he could bring Britain to heel through defeating the RAF and by the mere threat of invasion, installing a puppet government  along the lines of Marshal Petain's Vichy regime in France, thus taking Britain out of the war and allowing him to concentrate his entire forces on Russia.

After the war, when German Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt was interrogated by the Russians whilst in British custody, he was asked which battle he viewed as being the most decisive to the eventual outcome of the war. The Russians were no doubt expecting him to say 'Stalingrad' but instead the old Field Marshall replied 'The Battle of Britain.' Perhaps von Rundstedt said this merely to spite the Russians but whatever the reason, it was not the answer they were looking for and they promptly ended their questioning and left!

Even today, 75 years after the event, the Battle of Britain evokes powerful emotions and talk of 'The Few', Spitfires, Hurricanes, Dowding, Park as well as the Commonwealth and overseas pilots, Kiwis, Canadians, Poles, Czechs and Americans amongst the 2,927 pilots of all Allied nationalities who flew in the Battle, of which 510 perished.

We should be eternally grateful to them all.

Published Sources:

The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain - Stephen Bungay, Aurum Press 2000 

The Narrow Margin - Derek Wood with Derek Dempster - Tri Service Press 1990

Captain Evans, Monty and the Flying Fortress - an update

Monty with the crew of Theresa Leta (Bobbie Kinnear collection)

Regular readers may remember that in February 2014, I recounted some of the exploits of Captain (later Colonel) Richard E Evans USAAF and his crew when they were flying the Theresa Leta, B17 Flying Fortress which General Bernard Law Montgomery had 'won' in what was thought by General Eisenhower to be a light-hearted wager but which the deadly serious British general had insisted be 'paid out' to him.

Monty 'Learning the Ropes' (Bobbie Kinnear collection)

At the time of writing the second part of the story, I had a feeling that my crew list was incomplete but following a further meeting in London with Bobbie, her husband John and daughter Kate, I was alerted to a book called "Victory Mail of World War II; V-Mail, The Funny Mail" by Captain James W Hudson, who was heavily involved in the setting up of this vital morale boosting method of communicating with home for the boys posted overseas.

Monty at the controls (Bobbie Kinnear collection)

Although Hudson was based in Egypt running the V-Mail system, his official title was 'Senior Photographic Officer in the US Army Forces, Middle East' and thus in November 1943, he was appointed to be Photographic Censor for the Cairo Conference between Winston Churchill and President Franklin D Roosevelt  and ended up taking many of the photos of this event himself. Later still, he was at the 'Big Three' conference in Tehran, when Prime Minister and President were joined by Soviet Leader, Josef Stalin and it was during this period that Hudson got to fly in the Theresa Leta along with some illustrious passengers.

Bobbie has subsequently most kindly sent me a copy of the book, as well as some of the original photos that form part of her collection and which also appear in the book - perhaps originally taken by James Hudson.

As a result of reading Hudson's chapter on the Theresa Leta and her crew, as well as Captain Evans' as yet unpublished memoir, we can now show the complete crew list, their rank and position aboard Theresa Leta and where known, their hometown in the USA.

The Crew of the Theresa Leta:

Captain Richard E Evans (Pilot) (Tennessee)
Lieutenant Fred I Johnson (Co-Pilot) (Logansport, Indiana)
2nd Lieutenant Albert L Beringsmith (Bombardier) (Chicago, Illinois)
2nd Lieutenant Thomas Carver (Navigator) (Alameda, California)
Tech. Sergeant Dale Owens (Flight Engineer)
Staff Sergeant Francis (Frank) R Morris (Radio Operator) (Soodenow, Illinois)
Staff Sergeant Victor Kennedy (Waist Gunner) (Tylertown, Mississippi)
Tech. Sergeant Lewis (Top Turret)
Staff Sergeant Austin (Ball Turret)
Staff Sergeant Charles (Chuck) W Ward (Tail Gunner) (Albuquerque, New Mexico)

Also after writing the first series of articles, I received an email from Lee Beringsmith, the son of the Bombardier, Albert L Beringsmith. Lee spoke very highly of Captain Evans and recalled that his father felt that he was the best pilot in the squadron and gladly swapped places with another bombardier who suffered from nervous problems and wanted off Captain Evans' crew. Lee also kindly recounted an amusing story but one in which we see Monty's sometimes well hidden 'human' side which showed his insistence at nothing but the best for the men under his command:

"My Dad told me that when they reached Cairo, Monty had them check into the Cairo Hilton as part of his personal staff. As Monty left the B17, he told Captain Evans to call him if there were any problems. When they got to the front desk at the hotel, the rather rude clerk informed them that there were no rooms available. Captain Evans asked to use the phone and reached Monty. He passed the phone to the clerk and said 'General Montgomery would like to speak to you.' The desk clerk rolled his eyes, picked up the receiver and suddenly snapped to attention, saying ' Yes sir, yes sir, right away sir.' Needless to say, rooms were somehow magically found and the crew got a well deserved rest from their combat missions."

I am indebted to Bobbie Kinnear as always for her generous sharing of her family photographs and to Lee Beringsmith for his email and shared anecdotes.

Published Sources:

Victory Mail of World War II: V-Mail, the Funny Mail - Captain James W Hudson, Xlibris Corporation 2007

Unpublished Sources:

Unpublished memoir of Colonel Richard E Evans USAF